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Foreword 
Welfare Privatization  
as Authoritarian Upgrading 
Raymond Hinnebusch 
Two cutting edge studies in this St Andrews Papers series by Laura Ruiz 
de Elvira and Tina Zintl uncover the contributions of both regime-
controlled and regime-sponsored civil society to “authoritarian 
upgrading” in Syria. Across the region, projects to “upgrade” 
authoritarianism took very similar forms, amply documented in the 
literature. The underlying deep change was a movement from an 
originally populist form of authoritarianism to “post-populist” or neo-
liberal versions (Hinnebusch 2000, Pripstein-Posusney 1997, 
Ehteshami/Murphy 1996, Guazzone/Pioppi 2009). Authoritarian power 
was now used to pursue economic liberalization and privatization that 
shifted public assets to “networks of privilege” (Heydemann 2004). 
Authoritarian persistence cannot be explained by coercion alone and, 
indeed, the logic of authoritarian rule is to include some social forces in 
order to exclude others. Stephen King (2009) and Bradley Glasser 
(2001) showed how post-populist regimes used pressure from 
international institutions for privatization of state assets to enrich 
presidential families and ministers and to generate crony capitalist 
support bases substituting for the old populist coalition. In parallel, 
regimes manipulated institutions to incorporate these new elements 
while demobilizing those who stood to lose, workers and peasants. This 
dynamic prevented the emergence of democratic coalitions uniting 
elements of the bourgeoisie and working class.  
The parallel literature on hybrid regimes and electoral 
authoritarianism stressed how limited political liberalization and 
manipulated elections facilitated authoritarian persistence. Thus, Lust-
Okar (2004) and Kassem (2004) demonstrated how regimes were able to 
divide and rule the opposition by selectively including and excluding 
political groups. King (2009) and Glasser (2001) showed how, in 
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parallel, regimes fostered social forces supportive of economic 
liberalization by encouraging pro-business parties. Steven Heydemann’s 
(2007) idea of “authoritarian upgrading” particularly denoted the 
techniques by which post-populist regimes tried to compensate for the 
risks of abandoning their mass constituencies: they tapped new 
resources from investors, diversified their constituencies (to the business 
class and the ulama), and deployed cooptation and divide and rule 
strategies; they also offloaded welfare responsibilities to private forces 
and civil society while, in parallel, re-regulating state-society relations 
so as to keep control over these newly empowered forces. 
The study by Laura Ruiz de Elvira uncovers a particular form of this 
re-regulation. She details how the regime sought to both offload its 
welfare responsibilities to civil society, while yet not allowing these 
functions to escape regulation and, indeed, keeping some control over 
the considerable resources collected under the aegis of zakat. As she 
makes clear, charities rapidly expanded under Bashar al-Asad, filling 
real needs, especially as state provision declined under fiscal constraints; 
simultaneously, the state both promoted their activities and co-opted 
their patrons, notably Muslim religious leaders. An example of the latter 
was the re-privatization of charities nationalized during the regime’s 
early 1980s struggle with the Muslim Brotherhood. As Ruiz de Elvira 
shows also, however, state control became more intrusive as, for 
example, it moved to control appointments to the boards of Muslim 
charities.  
Tina Zintl’s study exposes a particular dimension of authoritarian 
upgrading in Syria: the Asad regime’s effort to divest part of the 
development functions of a state over-stretched, financially and in terms 
of administrative capabilities, to civil society, by fostering a plethora of 
development-oriented NGOs under its control. This also enabled it to 
encourage a secular and regime-friendly alternative to the growing 
power of a less-trusted Islamic civil society. For a while, this strategy, 
especially as promoted by an attractive and able First Lady, also 
diffused a modernizing and reforming image for the Asad regime both in 
the West and among returning Western-educated businessmen and 
technocrats whose engagement in Syria’s development was deemed 
crucial to the country’s move to a market economy and to the 
modernization of the human resources “software” of its infrastructure. 
This promotion and control of secular (and in parallel also of Christian) 
civil society also made it less dangerous for the regime to pursue its 
simultaneous cooptation of Islamic charities and associations thorough a 
similar process of outsourcing social responsibilities, and, in some ways, 
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to stand above these two wings of civil society as broker, ruling by 
dividing. 
Finally, it is worth observing that, while the literature on 
authoritarian upgrading exaggerated the stability of authoritarian 
regimes and neglected the hidden costs of upgrading techniques, failing, 
hence, to anticipate the 2011 Uprising, the literature did, if 
inadvertently, nevertheless expose many of the seeds of the Uprising. 
The root problem was arguably the fiscal crisis of the state, which forced 
it to divest itself of welfare and development responsibilities to the 
private sector and to civil society. But, to avoid possible threats to its 
rule from these empowered sectors, it sought, at the same time, to 
control them in a more intrusive way, as well as playing “divide and 
rule” politics among them. This, in inevitably causing resentment, had 
its hidden costs, which, together with the abandonment of the poor to 
their provision, generated some of the disaffected leadership and 
followings of the 2011 Uprising. Also important in understanding the 
uneven concentration of the Uprising in periphery areas as opposed to 
the two main city centres, was that, parallel to the urban/middle class-
centered fostering and re-regulation of civil society detailed in these 
studies, the regime simultaneously, as Zintl noted, allowed the 
debilitation of the former populist corporatist structures--workers 
unions, peasant unions--that used to incorporate its former mass 
constituency.  
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State-Charities Relations in Syria: 
Between Reinforcement, Control  
and Coercion 
Laura Ruiz de Elvira 
Introduction1  
Like other policy areas, the field of Syrian associations experienced 
several important changes during Bashar al-Asad’s first decade in power 
(2000-2010). In only five years the number of organisations registered 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MoSAL) almost 
tripled,2 going up from 555 in 2002 to 1,485 in 2009 (see Graphic 1). 
The first lady herself announced in 2010 an increase of 300% in a few 
years.3 A “new generation” of NGOs emerged,4 tackling different areas: 
development, environment protection, culture and, in a few cases, even 
advocacy (Le Saux 2006). All these elements pointed to a real rebirth of 
the associative sector (Ruiz de Elvira 2010), while, by comparison, in 
the period between 1963 (the year of the Baathist coup d’état) and the 
year 2000 no more than fifty organisations had been authorized by the 
MoSAL.5   
From our point of view, the revitalization and renewal of civil 
society in Syria – civil society understood as the constellation of 
associational forms that occupy the terrain between individuals and the 
state (Wiktorowicz 2000) – reflects a clear restructuring of the previous 
politics of the Baathist regime towards non-state actors: while during 
several decades the latter had been oppressed, from 2000 onwards they 
have been promoted. In the 21st century Syria has entered a “post-
populist” era, characterized by a reconfiguration of actors and lasting 
transformations (e.g. Picard 2005, Heydemann 2000), of which this is 
one. 
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Graph 1: Number of associations registered with MOSAL 
 
Source: Statistical Abstract, Central Bureau of Statistics, Damascus 
and statement of the former Minister of Social Affairs and Labour. 
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   The transformation of the associative sector has indeed taken place in 
the context of a readjusting state. This evolution is clearly in keeping 
with a broader process of economic and social change in which old 
paradigms and policies have been partly modified.6 Actually, the state’s 
support for civil society projects – and for charitable projects, more 
precisely – has taken place in a context whereby public institutions 
could no longer meet the needs of the population despite a real increase 
in their budgets7. This difficulty has been exacerbated by population 
growth and a corresponding increase in the demand for social services.8  
In this context, the number of charities increased,9 especially in 
Damascus and Aleppo, but not exclusively, where rich merchants and 
businessmen finance countless philanthropic projects.10 According to 
official numbers, they represented in the year 2008 more than 60% of 
the whole associative sector (Barout: without year), while in other 
countries of the region they are far less numerous.11 Likewise, the 
volume of these associations’ services strongly increased in this period. 
The Sunduq al-‘Afieh (the Health Fund) for instance, a charitable 
project of the Damascus Charities Union,12 experienced a spectacular 
evolution: the number of beneficiaries increased from 536 in 1997 to 
4,455 in 2006. Because of this initiative, during one decade 29,823 sick 
people had their medical care paid for (with 60,000 surgical treatments 
carried out), at a total cost of 953 million Syrian pounds (some 17 
million USD).13 In the same way, the number of beneficiaries of the 
Sunduq al-Mouwwada wa-l-Rahma (the Love and Mercy Fund), a fund 
that also depends on the Damascus Charities Union, increased from 44 
in 1999 to more than 550 in 2007.14 Hence, these charitable structures 
have become key actors both within the Syrian civil society and within 
the field of social welfare provision during the last ten years. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the 
state-charities relation in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s first decade. In 
order to do so, this paper will be divided into four parts. In the first part 
it will be briefly defined what the term “charities” means in the Syrian 
context. In the second part it will be shown how between 2000 and 2010 
these charities have been actively encouraged, through different 
mechanisms (registration facilities, land donations, official visits, etc.) 
by the Syrian authorities, who conceived these social structures as an 
efficient way for the state to “off-load” at least a part of its welfare 
responsibilities. Notwithstanding, it will be argued, the state-charities 
relation during this period has not limited itself to the reinforcement of 
these organizations owing to the contraction of the public administration 
of welfare services. In the third part it will be thus demonstrated that the 
expansion of this sector has been accompanied by the attempt to 
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redeploy the state and to upgrade the mechanisms that permit it to 
control and discipline these activities (registration of previous non-
registered charities, creation of GO-NGOs,15 etc.). Finally, in the fourth 
part, some examples will be given of the repressive and the coercive 
measures that, in extraordinary cases, have been undertaken against 
charities (banning religious leaders from the boards of directors, 
dissolution of boards of directors, etc.). 
The ethnographic data analysed here is based on two years of 
fieldwork, consisting of almost a hundred interviews and “participant 
observation” sessions undertaken between November 2007 and 
November 2009. The paper covers practices observed mainly in 
Damascus and Aleppo, where two thirds of the registered organisations 
deploy their activities. However, we have also paid attention to the 
associative sector in smaller cities such as Homs, Tartous and Palmyra, 
or villages such as Maaloula. This material is part of a larger research 
project to understand the role of the Syrian charities in the context of a 
readjusting state characterized by the reconfiguration of social policies. 
What does the term “charities” mean in Syria?16 
In Syria, charities have traditionally been the mainstay of associative 
life. Their roots date back to the Ottoman period. The allegedly first 
Muslim charity to see the light of day in the Bilad al-Sham region, 
Jam‘iyyat al-Makassed al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya (the Islamic 
Charitable Works Association), was founded in Beirut in 1878 and has 
today branches in several Syrian cities.17 However, it post-dated the first 
Christian Syrian charity, the Association Saint Vincent de Paul, founded 
in Damascus in 1863.18 Later on, other charities were created in the 
country at the start of the twentieth century. In Damascus these included 
the Jam‘iyyat al-Is‘af al-Khayriyya (the Relief Charitable Association, 
1907), an organisation for 6 to 13-year-old orphans that provided, and 
still provides today, housing and a teaching centre accredited by the 
Ministry of Education;19 the Orthodox Association Saint Grégoire 
(1912) which, as well as housing and educating orphaned children gave 
material support to those who needed it most;20 and the Jam‘iyyat al-
Ihsan al-Islamiyya (the Beneficent Islamic Association), a Shia 
organisation that looked after poor families from the Shia community 
and today runs a training centre for women. Most of these ancient 
associations are still active today although, in many cases, have 
extended their field of operations. 
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However, the fabric of Syrian charities only really began to be 
woven under the French mandate (1920-1946). Organisations such as al-
Tammadun al-Islami (the Islamic Civilisation, 1932) – which 
distinguished itself by not only being active in the charity sector but 
giving itself an intellectual mission as well – date from this period. As 
its former president puts it, its founding was part of a vast Islamic 
association movement, which emerged in the mid-1920s as a direct 
result of French colonisation (al-Khatib 2008/2009). It was at this point 
that numerous organisations were created as vehicles to put political 
demands to the Western occupier. This phenomenon was, however, also 
accompanied by the creation of less politicised charities, such as al-
Maytam al-Islami bi-Haleb (the Islamic Orphanage in Aleppo, 1920) or 
the Jam‘iyyat Nuqtat al-Halib (the Drop of Milk Association) in 
Damascus (1922). Founded by a group of women, Nuqtat al-Halib was 
chiefly intended to procure milk for poor women unable to breastfeed 
their infants. Besides, Christian charities developed in parallel to this in 
the 1930s and 1940s, linked to religious institutions (Boukhaima 2002). 
Among them was the charity al-Qadis Lawndius al-Khayriyya, founded 
in 1944, or the Damascus clinic al-Moustawsaf al-Khayri (the Charitable 
Clinic, 1946), which was created on the initiative of a group of 
physicians wishing to give free medical care to the underprivileged.21 
The golden age for charities, however, was the 1950s. Between 
January 1952 and April 1954, the number of charities registered in the 
country rose from 73 to 203 (Pierret 2009). This expansion was due to a 
more favourable environment characterised by flexible legislation, a 
liberal economic system and new religious leaders asserting their 
authority (ibid.). Some of the expansion consisted of charities, such as 
the Dar al-Hadith al-Nabawi al-Sharif (1953),22 which provided for the 
needs of religious schools. However, the majority were neighbourhood 
organisations that restricted themselves to distributing financial and 
material aid once or several times a month. An example of this is the 
Shaykh Mahhi al-Din association, which opens its doors only on Fridays 
before prayers. Generally, these charities were linked to the mosque in 
the neighbourhood where they were based. In other words, they were 
strongly localised organisations based on neighbourhood solidarity, a 
solidarity which in fact corresponded to a clientele relationship in the 
form of redistributing wealth. Their antecedents were the lajnat kibar al-
hara, or committees of a neighbourhood’s notables (zuama).23 Many of 
these charities are still working today, but as they have not evolved since 
being founded, they lag behind new MoSAL trends. Finally, it was also 
in the 1950s that the first charities with a wider scope, such as the 
networks Jam‘iyyat al-Nahda al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Awakening 
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Association, 1954) and Jam‘iyyat al-Birr wa-l-Khidmat al-Ijtima’iyya 
(the Charitable Works and the Social Services Association, 1955), were 
created. 
When the Baath Party took power and declared a state of emergency 
in 1963, the new regime began a process of bringing civil society “into 
line” (Seurat 1980: 122). In this context, civil-society initiatives were no 
longer welcome inasmuch as they were likely to contribute to challenges 
to established authority. The associative sector was penetrated and led 
by “popular organisations”, a means of controlling popular mobilisation. 
Hence, very few charities were founded during this period. Government 
control reached its peak at the end of the 1970s and start of the 1980s, 
when Islamist protests endangered Hafez al-Asad’s regime. Between 
1962 and 2000, the number of charities dropped from 596 to 513 (see 
Graphic 1). 
At the same time, the almost systematic refusal to authorise the 
founding of new charities led to “informal” organisations being 
developed, organisations that were not declared and were active behind 
the scenes, either through informal networks linked to charismatic 
individuals, or under the protection of Christian religious institutions, or 
else under the aegis of already registered charities, which functioned as 
umbrella organisations. It was only at the very end of the 1990s that the 
associative sector finally saw restrictions relatively loosened (Sottimano 
2009: 25).  
Therefore, the charities that have proliferated during the last ten 
years are only the prolongation of a long tradition of both Muslim and 
Christian beneficence. Their ideological, historical, sociological and 
political foundations – strongly linked, as Amy Singer shows, to 
religious beliefs and practices (Singer 2008) – are essentially based on a 
denominational, political-geographic and often clientele-orientated 
structure (Karam 2002). Their evolution, as we have just exposed, is 
intrinsically linked to the country’s political and social history. As in 
Jordan and Lebanon, they typically rely upon the urban, professional 
middle class for voluntarism and donations (Baylouny 2010; Clark 
2004). 
Today the charity sector is characterised by heterogeneity. Its fields 
of activities are extremely varied. To traditional charitable activities – 
looking after orphans and the elderly, supporting poor families, 
providing medical care or financing religious education – have been 
added projects of a new kind seeking to integrate a “development” 
dimension. Among the latter are assistance for young couples wishing to 
marry; countering unemployment through training courses and 
launching for-profit activities; attempts to eradicate begging using 
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centres to help people get back into the job market; literacy and IT 
courses for illiterate mothers; and more recently the granting of micro-
credits. Clearly, charities have tried to adapt and seize the zeitgeist. The 
line between charity and development has thus become increasingly 
blurred and given way to new hybrid organisations.24 Under MoSAL 
pressure, their role has in many cases evolved from simply collecting 
and redistributing money to the poor within a community or 
neighbourhood, to a more sophisticated and diverse specialised activity. 
According to those interviewed, these organisations no longer seek to 
“give fish to the poor to feed them for a day, but rather to teach them 
how to fish.” 
Above all, these structures respond to real needs of the population. 
They are the manifestation of a still-fragile civil society that has been 
shaped by its difficult relationship with the government and the Baathist 
regime. By no means are they inactive empty shells intended merely to 
collect funds from international sponsors or the Syrian state.25 Actually, 
through a complex and permanent process of negotiation punctuated by 
intermittent repression, the social activists who now constitute this 
sector have profited from several years of relative tolerance (mainly 
between 2004 and 2008) by deploying their own strategies (involving 
notables, religion, socialisation, etc.), either through founding new 
charities or through developing already existing ones. Whilst trying to 
escape, circumvent or use to their own profit the disciplinary 
mechanisms established by the Baathist regime, Syrian charities have 
succeeded in creating leeway within a very restrictive political system. 
Their significant contribution to social welfare together with their 
“apolitical” approach and their great popularity has been their main asset 
to do so. Furthermore, they are far from being puppets of the 
government. The Hefth al-Ni‘me association (Preservation of Grace), 
for instance, established in 2002 and registered with MoSAL in 2006, 
has become one of the main charities in the country even if (or, rather, 
thanks to the fact that) its founder, Shaykh Sariya al-Rifa‘i, a leader of 
the powerful Zayd movement,26 is not a regime-friendly religious 
leader27 as the Syrian revolt of 2011 has proved.  
Yet, although the charity sector in Syria (and in the Arab world, 
more generally) is a stimulating subject for analysis, studies of this kind 
of associations are rare.28 From our point of view, the interest of this 
topic in the Syrian case is twofold. First, it constitutes an empirical 
approach to analyze the transformations that have taken place during the 
last ten years in the associative field itself, in terms of the renewal of 
actors, new balances of power, revision of strategies and approaches, 
introduction of new methods and new rhetoric, etc. Secondly, it 
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represents a good method to grasp the real impact of the switch from a 
centralised economy to a “social market” model in which the previous 
social politics of the Baathist regime have been reconsidered by the 
Syrian authorities.29 
The reinforcement “from above” 
Seeking to guarantee economic growth and social welfare provision, 
Syria’s successive governments have undertaken since the eighties a 
series of liberalization efforts, with one major wave occurring between 
1986-1991, and others following at various intervals ever since. As 
Raymond Hinnebusch explains:  
“the rent-driven expansion of the state during the seventies exceeded 
Syria’s economic base and when rent and growth declined in the 
eighties, patronage dried up and the state began to shed some of its 
economic responsibilities. Private business had to be given 
concessions to fill the economic gap, notably by the curbing of state 
intervention and widening of space for the market”  
(Hinnebusch 1995: 231).  
The most recent of these efforts took place in 2005 with the introduction 
of the term “social market economy” at the Tenth Regional Congress of 
the Baath party. However, whilst in the previous periods the 
liberalization had only benefited the private sector,30 Bashar al-Asad’s 
liberalization policies have equally targeted civil society and the 
associative sector.31  
Thus, in the 21st century’s Syria, responsibility has officially 
become, more than ever before, “multilateral”. Indeed, as the Tenth Five 
Year Plan emphasized: 
“Social market economy entails that development process 
responsibilities should not be limited to the central government with 
the burden put on the state for plan implementation tasks. 
Responsibility must be multilateral and will have to include the private 
sector, provincial governments, NGOs and civil society groups.”32  
Non-state actors have been urged by the public authorities to play a new 
role and to strongly contribute to the national development process. The 
purpose, the government has argued, is to  
“encourage civil society organizations’ contribution to local 
development efforts, and provide incentives to the development 
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processes based upon collective efforts, and offer them financial, 
technical and human resources.”33  
Moreover, as it can be perceived in the following passage of the same 
document, that notions of “participation” and “partnership” have 
become keywords in the renewed governmental discourse:  
“Transition to a social market economy adopted by the state, with the 
FYP undertaking the task of providing a conducive environment for its 
successful launch, will certainly require forging a new social contract 
among the vital forces in the Syrian society. These are comprised of 
the state, private sector, and civil society organizations bounded 
through healthy dialogue and interactive participation in formulating 
and implementing the Plan. Such partnership is the only route to win 
the societal transformation and meet the associated challenges.”34 
In this context, although the governmental authorities have repeatedly 
declared their wish to see the traditional charities evolve toward “more 
developmental structures”,35 charities have been de facto particularly 
favoured as compared to developmental, cultural and, obviously, 
advocacy organizations. We can thus address the following two 
questions: why and how charities have been favoured during Bashar al-
Asad’s first decade?  
Why have charities been favoured?  
During the last ten years, the charity sector has gradually become a 
“partner” of the state. The principle of cooperation with civil society, on 
which the Tenth Five Year Plan (2006-2010) was supposed to be based, 
has gone from words to deeds, via the ‘uqud tasharukiyye (association 
agreements). Through these agreements, the maintenance, management 
and often financing of certain public institutions – such as schools, 
health centres and other welfare structures – have passed into the hands 
of certain charities in order “to better guarantee a good service to the 
population and share welfare responsibilities between the public and the 
private sector.”36 There is no shortage of examples – they have been 
held up as the key to success in the development process.  
The Qaws Quzah association (Rainbow, in English), for instance, 
founded in 2002,37 signed several years ago an agreement with the 
MoSAL according to which the management of the only public 
Damascene orphanage, the Dar Zayd Ben Haretha which hosts around 
160 orphans,38 became its responsibility. The magazine Syria Today 
gave some details of this partnership in one of its articles:  
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“Rainbow’s ‘sponsor a child’ programme was launched in 2003. By 
paying SYP 300 (USD 6,50) monthly, sponsors can visit Zayd bin 
Haretha’s orphans and take them out on trips, under the supervision of 
Rainbow staff. Before the exhibition, Rainbow had around 100 
sponsors. At the DIF [Damascus International Fair], the charity 
recruited an extra 15 sponsors, as well as a number of volunteers”.39 
Thanks to this agreement, the MoSAL managed to outsource for several 
years the financing, administration and management of this public 
institution that has remained nevertheless “public”. Moreover, in 2009, 
for reasons that we cannot detail here, the management of the Dar Zayd 
Ben Haretha passed into the hands of a new association, the Jam‘iyyat 
Sunduq al-Raja’ (the Fund of Hope Association), founded in 1970 and 
registered with MoSAL in 2004. At the present moment this association 
runs simultaneously two public institutions: the orphanage Dar Zayd 
Ben Haretha, on the one hand, and the center Rawdat al-Sum wa-l-
Bukum (the Oasis of Deaf and Dumbness), for the deaf and dumb 
persons, on the other hand.40 
Likewise, the Jam‘iyyat al-Khayriyya bi-Haleb (the Charitable 
Association in Aleppo) signed in 2009 an agreement with the Ministry 
of Religious Endowments.41 According to it, the administration and the 
management of the institution, Moubarra al-Awqaf al-Islamiyya (the 
Charitable Institution for the Islamic Religious Endowments) in Aleppo, 
founded in 1961 as a specialized center for the elder, became the 
responsibility of this private charity. In addition to it, the Charitable 
Association from Aleppo agreed to restore the existing premises, 
provide and train the new medical staff and, finally, pay the 
employees.42 In exchange for these services, the Ministry of Religious 
Endowments (to which the above-mentioned institution belongs) 
committed itself both to grant the charity every year a certain amount of 
money and to give it the required permission to raise funds in the 
mosques of Aleppo.  
As for the charity Jam‘iyyat al-Bustan al-Khayriyya (the Garden 
Charitable Association, 1999), founded by Rami Makhlouf – first cousin 
of Bashar al-Asad and probably the richest man in Syria – in the city of 
Latakia, it too has signed several ‘uqud tasharukiyye with the Syrian 
state, with the Ministry of Health to be specific. One of these 
agreements consisted in restoring the public hospital of Jable as well as 
other medical centers in the Latakia governorate. Another one consisted 
in financing the entire construction of the hospital al-Shahid Ibrahim 
Ni‘ma al-Watani al-Jadid, of which the first stone was placed by the 
Minister of Health himself.43 On that occasion the Minister underlined 
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the great importance of these agreements in improving the public 
services and infrastructures in all the regions of the country.44 Indeed, 
according to SANA, Syria’s official press agency, al-Bustan al-
Khayriyya paid out more than 90 million Syrian pounds in only two 
years in order to develop and improve the existing health centers in 
Latakia’s region.45 Moreover, in 2010 this charity was planning to spend 
about 160 million Syrian pounds in the coming period.46 Lastly, in 2011, 
once the Syrian revolt had started, Rami Makhlouf, who was the first 
target of the protesters, promised to increase its charitable activity via its 
association al-Bustan al-Khayriyya. Nevertheless, this promise didn’t 
convince the opposition, who accused him of being the family banker 
and, above all, highly corrupt.47 
In a context of increasing economic difficulties, it is clear that 
thanks to this kind of agreements the Syrian state has partially 
outsourced the spending and the management of several public 
institutions whilst they have supposedly remained state-owned. 
Therefore, these contracts are, from our point of view, the evidence of 
the implementation of a strategy that follows a logic of partial “off-
loading” by the state (“décharge de l’Etat” in the French literature), a 
formula at work in many countries.48 According to Béatrice Hibou, one 
of the main characteristics of this logic is the alteration of the relations 
between the “public” and the “private” as well as between the “political” 
and the “economical” (Hibou 1999: 7f). The example of al-Bustan al-
Khayriyya is particularly clear in this respect. In fact, while al-Bustan is 
a private charity, it has been supporting and financing numerous public 
institutions and projects in the last years. Moreover, while most of the 
funds of this charity have been provided by Rami Makhlouf, that is a 
private entrepreneur, the fortune of this man has been built thanks to his 
links with the regime and the Syrian state itself.  
Finally, besides the financial and utilitarian reasons, the 
reinforcement “from above” of the Syrian charities during Bashar al-
Asad’s first decade has probably also been motivated both by the desire 
to co-opt the powerful religious leaders who, until late 2008, were at the 
head of these initiatives, as well as by an attempt to attract the foreign 
funds meant for civil society-promotion programs in the Middle East. 
Likewise, it is worth pointing out that the period in which these 
structures have been promoted the most (between the years 2004 and 
2008) coincides with a moment of major international isolation of Syria 
due to its positioning against the Iraq war and to the assassination of 
Rafiq Hariri.49 Hence, by giving some leeway to domestic civil society 
actors the regime intended most likely to find at home the support that it 
had lost abroad.  
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How have they been promoted? Through which mechanisms? 
Among the different channels that the Syrian state has been employing 
during the last ten years in order to support and promote charities we 
will point out five here: the media campaign, the presidential couple’s 
and government officials’ personal visits to associations, the 
normalization process undertaken by the MoSAL so as to register 
“informal” structures, the privatization of former public structures and, 
finally, the sale or the rent of public land to charities at preferential 
prices.  
First, mostly since the year 2004, state-run newspapers – such as 
Tishreen or Al-Thawra – and newly created “independent” magazines – 
such as Syria Today – have carried on an effective campaigns to support 
Syrian charities. Through focused articles these newspapers and 
magazines have underlined the important role of these organisations in 
providing social welfare, in fighting poverty or in carrying out 
developmental projects. These articles have greatly contributed to make 
Syrian charities known by announcing the newly created ones or by 
covering public events organized by them. The following paragraph, 
extracted from Syria Today, constitutes a typical example:  
“Like a growing number of Syrians, Mohammad Fathy Qawadri has 
turned to a third source of life-saving help: the newly created NGOs 
and charities that provide free care, medicine and social support for the 
needy. “Without these charities, my family and I would not be able to 
cope,” he said. […] A number of NGOs that specialise in health care 
and drug provision are now running in Damascus. One of them is 
Sunduq al- Afieh, the “health fund”, a Syrian charity established by 
Damascene philanthropists. It uses a flexible and efficient system to 
help poor patients requiring fast treatment – something the state-run 
system cannot easily provide. Rather than stand in month-long queues 
at a government-owned hospital, the patient can drop in at the charity’s 
headquarters in Midan, a Damascus suburb, and fill in an application 
for help.”50 
Second, the First Lady as well as some governmental personalities and 
local figures have directly supported charities by paying them official 
visits. These visits have, first, contributed to legitimize these structures 
and, second, increased their symbolic and media visibility. These visits 
have generally been broadcasted in official TV channels and 
newspapers, thus publicizing their work. The fact that pictures of these 
official visits are generally visibly displayed in the headquarters of these 
associations illustrates the importance of this kind of support in the eyes 
of the social actors. Likewise, some associations highlight these visits on 
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their websites. Hefth al-Ni‘me, for instance, had in 2008 an entire 
section on its website where pictures of the official visits that it had 
received were displayed.51 Among them there were three pictures with 
the Minister of Religious Endowments, with the Minister of Social 
Affairs and Labour and with the Governor of Damascus, respectively. 
Furthermore, these same pictures were equally exhibited in some of the 
leaflets of this association (see Picture 1). 
Picture 1: Official visits to Hefth al-Ni‘me  
 
Source: Leaflet of Hefth al-Ni‘me, without year. 
But the state support for charities has gone well beyond media articles 
and official visits. In fact, and this is the third channel the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labour has encouraged, especially around the years 
2004 and 2005, the normalization and formalization of pre-existing 
informal networks committed to social works. In this context, letters 
were sent to non-registered charities asking them to normalize their 
situation by registering with this ministry. The al-Safine association (the 
Ark), for example, a Christian charity that supports young handicapped 
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people and operates under the patronage of the Latin Church, received 
one of these letters from the MoSAL several years ago.52 Likewise, 
several Christian religious leaders were contacted in order to discuss the 
same issue regarding other associations. In addition, the accreditation 
procedure for new associations became more flexible from 2004 
onwards. As a result, non-authorized charities – that had been working 
during several years, or even decades, without being registered with the 
MoSAL – were finally allowed to “formalize” their legal status. All this 
led many to affirm that “they opened the door to create new 
associations” (fatahu bab ta’sis al-jam’iyyat),53 “they” referring to the 
MoSAL and, ultimately, to the regime. 
Indeed, either willing to grab this opportunity or, in some cases, 
feeling obliged to do so, most informal charities decided to register. 
Only some associations, most of them Christian, preferred and were 
tacitly permitted not to do so. In the case of Christian structures, this 
decision has sometimes been motivated by the conviction that remaining 
under the sponsorship of the religious institutions will preserve the 
autonomy of the association. This was the case of al-Safine, for instance. 
In other cases, this decision has rather been the consequence of internal 
conflicts: while the secular administrators of these associations wanted 
to “legalize” them, the religious “patrons” – who desire to preserve their 
centrality and their authority in them – refused.54  
As for the fourth channel used to promote charities, we can mention 
the privatization (or more precisely, de-nationalization) of several 
formerly state-managed structures. As Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvick 
remark:  
“In Hama, for instance, the Maktab al-Ri΄aya al-Ijtima΄iyya (Social 
Care Bureau), that was born from the 1983 nationalization of Al-
Nahda al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Awakening), the city’s most powerful 
charitable association, was turned into a private body in 2003 and 
became Al-Jam΄iyya al-Khayriyya li-l-Ri΄aya al-Ijtima΄iyya 
(Charitable Association for Social Care), which opened several 
sections in the villages of Hama’s countryside” (Pierret/Selvik 2009: 
602). Likewise, two years earlier, “the former Jam΄iyyat A΄mal al-Birr 
al-Islamiyya (Islamic Association for Charitable Works), the oldest 
organization of its kind in the city (1925), had been re-established as a 
private body under the name Jam΄iyyat A΄mal al-Birr” (ibid.).  
Thus, some associations which had been nationalized in the 1980s (the 
worst period for the Syrian civil society) have recovered their legal 
autonomy during the last decade. 
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Finally, the state’s support for charities has sometimes been 
channelled through the sale or the transfer of public land to charities at 
preferential prices. Even if this kind of transfer is not new – the 
Jam‘iyyat al-Moubarra al-Nisa’iyya (the Feminine Charitable Works 
Association), for instance, received a big piece of land from Damascus 
governorate in the 1970s55 – it has become more frequent since the 
arrival of Bashar al-Asad into the presidency in the year 2000. There are 
many examples. Among them, the Jam΄iyyat al-Birr (the Association for 
Charitable Works) in Palmyra was granted a 3,000 m² piece of land by 
the local administration for which it only paid 5 Syrian pounds per 
square meter.56 Similarly, in 2005, the Damascus Charities Union 
received a huge piece of land from Damascus governorate in order to 
build its charitable al-‘Afie hospital; the transaction was determined by a 
presidential decree. The total cost of the sale was 990,000 Syrian 
pounds,57 a symbolic price for a big ground located in the 
neighbourhood of Midan, in the very center of Damascus.58 
These five examples are evidence of an active reinforcement of 
charitable associations “from above”. Furthermore, they give a sense of 
the mechanisms through which the Syrian state has been promoting 
these charities in recent years. At the end of the day, we can say that the 
regime has favoured developing this “primary” kind of organisation over 
other bodies which are less easy to control and potentially cause more 
political activism, such as lobbying organisations. 
The redeployment of the Syrian state: control and 
disciplinarization  
Notwithstanding, the state-charities relation does not limit itself to the 
reinforcement of these organizations “from above”. Actually, the 
expansion of this sector has been accompanied by the attempt to upgrade 
the mechanisms that permit the state institutions and the regime to 
regulate, control and disciplinarize these activities. Therefore, we argue, 
the strengthening of the charities “from above” during the last ten years 
should not be interpreted as a sign of the retreat of the state, as some 
analysts have considered it,59 but rather as a sign of its redeployment. In 
the following section we will point out three of these mechanisms: the 
above-mentioned normalization process, the strengthening of the role of 
the MoSAL and, finally, the creation of GO-NGOs. 
The first of these mechanisms is the normalization or formalization 
process of pre-existing “informal” networks. As mentioned above, by 
this process dozens (and probably hundreds) of previous “informal” 
associations, most of them charities, have indeed registered with the 
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Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour during the last decade. This 
arguably results from the desire to eliminate spaces that are not under 
the state’s surveillance. In fact, once those activities are registered with 
the MoSAL, the security apparatus together with the employees of the 
MoSAL can more easily control/direct them as they become visible 
structures. Manipulation and influencing becomes likewise possible, as 
by being legalized, they also tacitly accept the rules of the game. 
Quintan Wiktorowicz has observed the same mechanism of what he 
calls “social control” in Jordan. He describes how organizations, once 
they were legally registered in this country, found themselves 
“embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes which 
allows those in power to monitor and regulate collective activities” 
(Wiktorowicz 2000: 43). In Syria, these “bureaucratic practices” can be 
permissions needed to organize an excursion or an activity, or to collect 
donations, as well as regular visits made by the employees of the 
MoSAL. Along the same lines but from a different perspective, Steven 
Heydemann has interpreted the opening of the civic sector in several 
countries of the Arab world as a mark of a broader process of 
“authoritarian upgrading”. According to him:  
“the hallmark of authoritarian upgrading is the ability of Arab regimes 
to exploit rather than resist broad social, political, and economic trends 
[…]. Rather than shut down civil societies entirely, however, regimes 
gradually adopted a range of complex strategies to reassert state 
control over burgeoning civic sectors” (Heydemann 2007).  
Thus, the strategy of easing the restrictions on the authorization process 
is one that ultimately aims at and permits to better co-opt, monitor and 
regulate these associations via the MoSAL.  
   Linked to the preceding idea, the second of these mechanisms is the 
strengthening of the role of the MoSAL, which has become a central 
institution in the daily life of Syrian associations. This ministry opened 
several years ago a new section which is exclusively in charge of 
dealing with the associations’ affairs. According to Diala al-Hajj Aref, 
former Minister of Social Affairs and Labour, the role of this ministry is 
not to give material or financial support to associations but rather to plan 
and dictate the general lines that must be followed by them and to 
coordinate and harmonize the different projects they undertake; it is a 
role of ishraf (supervising) and moutaba‘a (monitoring), she says.60 
Besides having a clear function of political marketing (so as to improve 
the public image of the MoSAL and, ultimately, of the regime in the 
eyes of the Syrian population and of the foreign actors), these 
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declarations by Diala al-Hajj Aref seem especially interesting since they 
underline at once not only the central role which the MoSAL claims to 
play but also the determination to set up new tools and principles for the 
social action of the public agencies and structures. Furthermore, in order 
to preserve its centrality, the MoSAL has monopolized all the 
information regarding the associative sector. Since 2008, for instance, 
the statistics concerning the number of the registered associations in the 
country have not been disclosed by the MoSAL and are, consequently, 
unavailable in the Central Bureau of Statistics. Finally, besides 
reinforcing the role of the charities it has created new social institutions 
like the National Social Aid Fund or the High Institution for the 
Integration of Handicapped People.  
The former, the National Social Aid Fund, is active only since 
January 2011,61 although the project was launched jointly by UNDP, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and UNFPA already in 2007 
based on the available statistics in 2004's “Income and Expenditure 
Survey.”62 As officially exposed, its main purposes are: to “protect and 
nurture targeted individuals and families through providing regular or 
emergency aid”, “enable the beneficiaries economically, socially, and in 
the fields of health and education”, and “promote development and 
investment in human capital.”63 In order to do so, the National Social 
Aid Fund is meant to implement its own programmes as well as to 
network with private and associative institutions. In principle, funds can 
be collected from any of the 167 government distribution centres – 
mostly post offices – countrywide. Speaking at the fund's launch in 
January, the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour, Diala Hajj Aref, said 
that “in 2011, 10 to 12 billions Syrian Pounds (213m to 256m USD) will 
be distributed to 420,000 households eligible for benefits.”64 
Finally, the third mechanism of control and disciplinarization we 
will highlight here is the creation of several GO-NGOs.65 These 
organizations, which have rapidly developed in the last years, are 
intimately linked to the First Lady although other governmental figures, 
such as Diala al-Hajj Aref, have created their own GO-NGO as well. 
They represent the societal project of President al-Asad and his wife, 
which is supposed to be based on the idea of “partnership” with and 
“responsibility” of citizens. GO-NGOs have succeeded in monopolizing 
certain activities and networks in a quasi-corporatist fashion through a 
de facto monopoly of representation, thereby reproducing old patterns of 
authoritarian rule at the same time that the regime officially pretends to 
endorse civic pluralism. They can actually be considered as real centres 
of power or, using the terminology of Philippe Droz-Vincent, as “lieux 
du regime”,66 since they are used as mechanisms of control, 
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disciplinarization and patronage. Through them the regime has aimed at 
shaping the civil society. At the same time, they have served as useful 
channels to co-opt social actors, coordinate projects and depoliticize the 
civil society. The Syria Trust for Development in particular, the biggest 
GO-NGO launched by the First lady in 2007, describes itself as being  
“at the forefront of the emerging NGO sector in Syria, at a time when 
the country is actively pursuing a substantial agenda for change. We 
are setting standards, encouraging professional development, and 
fostering effective collaboration between NGOs, government and the 
private sector.”67  
By organizing “The first international development confererence in 
Syria” in 2010 or by launching an NGO network, the Trust has aimed to 
emerge as the pioneer of the associative sector in Syria, a sector that it 
has tried to control and manipulate according to its needs. Finally, GO-
NGOs have had a privileged access to the state’s resources and to 
foreign actors, an access they have tried to monopolize. They have 
participated in most of the workshops and projects managed by foreign 
institutions. By doing so, they have prevented independent associations 
from participating in these kind of activities. Hence, the tactic of 
creating GO-NGOs has been an effective method to perpetuate the 
regime’s power and to control the associative sector.  
Finally, the ‘uqud tasharukiyye – that we mentioned before both as a 
way for the state to outsource the spending and the management of some 
of the public institutions and as a way of reinforcing the role of the 
charities – can also be considered as an instrument of control of these 
associations and as a channel for the state to redeploy itself via new 
channels.  
These few examples confirm from our point of view that the state- 
charities relation during Bashar al-Asad’s first decade has not limited 
itself to the reinforcement of the latter by the authorities. They show as 
well how the Syrian state has tried to redeploy itself throw new 
mechanisms such as the partnership with the private charities or the 
strengthening of the role of the MoSAL.  
Repressive and coercive measures 
This fourth and last part aims at providing some examples of the 
repressive and coercive measures that have been taken against charities 
in the last years. This sort of measures has aimed ultimately at 
strengthening the state’s control over charitable activities as well as over 
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Islamic movements and, in some cases, at punishing actors who have 
crossed “red lines.” We will point out very briefly three of them: the 
prohibition of the mawa’id al-rahme (“Tables of Mercy”, that is, public 
fast-breaking where food is provided for the poor), the removal of 
religious individuals from the charities’ boards and, finally, the 
dissolution of boards.  
In August 2008, the recently appointed Minister of Religious 
Endowments Muhammad Abd al-Sattar al-Sayyid announced the end of 
“the era of anarchy” (Pierret/Selvik 2009: 609). In this framework, he 
took two important decisions regarding the charitable activities in Syria:  
First, he forbade charities and mosques to hold the mawa’id al-
rahme during Ramadan. These events – which had become very 
successful in previous years in Syria as in other countries of the region, 
e.g. Lebanon or Egypt,68 – were financed by rich merchants and famous 
charities. In 2006, for instance, the Hefth al-Ni΄me association had 
offered the iftar (fast-breaking) to 10,000 people in the Omayyad 
mosque via the project iftar al-sa’im. The reasons the Ministry of 
Religious Endowments gave for prohibiting these events were the desire 
of protecting the mosques from being dirtied and profaned with this kind 
of practices. Furthermore, the authorities argued both that the people 
benefiting from these tables were not “poor people” but rather profiteers 
and that the zakat (alms giving) and sadaqa (voluntary giving) were 
meant to be paid in secret and not publicly.69 Yet, in reality this decision 
resulted mainly from the determination to prevent merchants, rich 
businessmen and religious men from using these public celebrations for 
their own benefit (in terms of notability, visibility, publicity, etc.) as 
well as from the will to stop collective mass gatherings. That is the 
reason why, although the mawa’id al-rahme were indeed forbidden, 
charities were actually allowed to keep on distributing iftar individually. 
Instead of eating the iftar collectively in a public space (mosque, square 
or street), the beneficiaries were given food parcels to take home. 
During the Ramadan of the year 2010, for instance, the charity Hefth al-
Ni΄me distributed more than 22,000 meals per day to the destitute 
families of Damascus.70 
Second, at the end of 2008 anyone working in a clerical role – such 
as imams or prayer leaders at mosques and teachers at religious 
institutions – was compelled to step down from any official post he 
might hold in a charitable institution. In fact, as Thomas Pierret and 
Kjetil Selvik describe,  
“on September 27, a car-bombing killing seventeen in a suburb of 
Damascus provided the Ministry with the opportunity to widen the 
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scope of its plan by imposing complete ministerial control over private 
Shari΄a institutes and dismissing the country’s Muslim clerics, 
including Sariya and Osama al-Rifa΄i, from the charitable associations’ 
boards of directors. Substitutes were chosen by the authorities from 
lists of three candidates that each of the concerned ΄ulama’ was asked 
to provide” (Pierret/Selvik 2009: 609).  
These candidates, chosen by the clerics among their loyal clients, had to 
be secular. Thus, while historically clerics had always been heads of 
charitable initiatives in Syria, in 2008 they found themselves suddenly 
banned from practicing this activity, at least legally. Salah Kaftaro, for 
instance, the former administrator of the Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaro 
Foundation, chose the engineer Mouhannad Alloush, married to his 
niece, to replace him at the head of the Jam‘iyyat al-Ansar al-Khayriyya 
(the Supporters Charitable Association), which belongs to that 
foundation. Furthermore, while Muslim religious men were then 
dismissed from their positions at the head of Muslim charities, Christian 
associations were still allowed to remain legally under the patronage of 
the Church and some of them are even presided over by Christian 
religious leaders. The reasons of this decision, from which the 
government never backed down, were clearly linked to the regime’s 
desire to prevent Sunni religious men from increasing their social 
capital, their influence and their visibility via those charities. 
Finally, we can mention another measure that has been taken by the 
MoSAL from time to time: the decision to dissolve a charity’s board of 
directors. This practice is authorised by the Law number 93 of 1958 
(that is, the Law of Associations), which establishes that the MoSAL can 
dissolve the board of any charity at any moment.71 In June 2009, for 
instance, the board of directors of the Aleppo Charities Union (founded 
in 1961) was dissolved by the MoSAL one day before its re-election; it 
was replaced by a “temporary” board nominated by the minister Diala 
al-Hajj Aref.72 By this decision the MoSAL actually cancelled the 
annual meeting of this union, thus preventing it from choosing a new 
“independent” board. The members of the new board, who were still on 
duty in 2011, were chosen by the MoSAL among regime-friendly 
candidates.  
These three examples prove from our point of view that besides 
reinforcing the work and the role of the charities, the Syrian regime has 
equally tried to limit the autonomy and the strengthening of this sector 
by putting important restrictions to its activities and, in some occasions, 
by side-lining regime-hostile personalities.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has provided some analytical keys to understanding state-
charities relations in Syria since the arrival of Bashar al-Asad at the 
presidency. In the first place it has been shown how the revitalization of 
this sector has been significantly promoted “from above” by the Syrian 
authorities through different methods. In the second place it has been 
demonstrated that the expansion of this sector has been accompanied by 
the attempt to redeploy the state and to upgrade the mechanisms that 
permit it to control and disciplinarize these activities. By new 
legislation, by dictating red lines and domains of action, by normalizing 
previous informal structures, by adopting the role of an arbiter, by 
selecting the projects that are authorized to flourish, and finally by 
developing partnerships with charities and NGOs, the Syrian leadership 
has attempted to reorganize the state while increasing social control over 
non-state actors. Furthermore, it has been evidenced here that this 
strategy follows a logic of partial outsourcing by the state. Finally, some 
examples have been provided of the repressive and the coercive 
measures that have been taken against charities in order to restrict their 
activities and their autonomy. In conclusion, the state-charities relation 
in Bashar al-Asad’s Syria is one that has been characterized by a double 
dialectic: on the one hand, the need to promote non-state actors because 
of their important contribution to development and welfare; on the other 
hand, the need to restrict and control these actors in order to preserve the 
supremacy of the regime. Therefore, periods of relative openness and 
relaxation towards charitable organizations have been interrupted by 
repressive measures whenever needed.  
All these changes reflect, from our point of view, the renegotiation 
and redefinition of the tacit and inclusive “social pact” that, five decades 
ago, had been concluded between the Syrian regime and the different 
social forces.73 Although the state has certainly remained the dominant 
agent of redistribution and the main provider of social welfare, non-state 
actors – that is, the private sector and the associative sector – have 
become increasingly important in ensuring economic growth and social 
welfare provision to a rising and impoverishing population. In the short 
term, Bashar al-Asad’s policies generated a new situation of 
interdependence between the public sector and social actors in which 
new patron-client networks developed. We have been able to observe in 
the field a gradual shift of state / society relations and resources in which 
the Syrian regime has been forced to find some accommodation with 
successful and well-rooted players, such as al-Rifa’i’s network, even if 
they were not totally politically pliant. Furthermore, by outsourcing part 
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of its former responsibilities the Syrian state and, ultimately, the regime, 
have lost much of their legitimacy and credibility. In the medium-term, 
with the aid of the spark of the “Arab Spring”, the new balance of power 
has degenerated into a popular revolt whose end is still unknown.  	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Modernization Theory II:  
Western-Educated Syrians and the 
Authoritarian Upgrading  
of Civil Society 
Tina Zintl 
While talk about civil society and NGOs was almost non-existent in 
Syria under Hafiz al-Asad’s rule, the 2000s not only saw a significant 
rise of these activities per se but also of speeches and news coverage on 
them. A far-reaching media campaign on the achievements of the Syria 
Trust for Development and other developmental agencies pervaded the 
latter half of the 2000s, with a large share of it published in perfect 
English on professionally designed web pages or in high-gloss 
magazines. 
This article will highlight how, among the different Syrian social 
actors, the regime particularly encouraged foreign-educated 
professionals and businessmen to engage in developmental and societal 
activities and will show what kind of intended effects this had on the 
authoritarian regime’s image and legitimacy. It aims to add to the 
existing literature on authoritarian regimes’ civil society promotion (e.g. 
Heydemann 2007) by going into more detail about one key group 
amongst its main players. The focus is on "cosmopolitan" actors and 
how they helped the Syrian regime to meet two – only on first glance 
contradictory – goals: development and authoritarian power 
maintenance. 
To do so, this article first gives a brief overview of the theoretical 
notions of authoritarian upgrading and Modernization Theory and, in 
particular, overlaps and linkages between these very different two 
strands of literature. The second part looks at Syria's civil society 
activism during the 2000s and at the regime as an actor both against and 
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for – or even instead of – civil society. The significant role of Western-
trained professionals in this regime-assisted surge of civil society will be 
detailed in the third section. This group of actors frequently stems from 
a younger generation of crony businessmen, whose recently growing 
interest in philanthropy and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) will 
be discussed in section four. The then following section on Western 
"indirect" actors and Islamic "marginalized" actors illustrates how 
Western-educated returnees and successful businessmen fit, 
unknowingly, into authoritarian regimes' divide-and-rule-tactics. The 
sixth section will investigate how the protests in 2011 have had a 
twofold impact with, on one hand, the regime stepping up its 
"modernizing project", which, on the other hand, has been rendered less 
convincing by the rising bloodshed and the ensuing economic crisis 
brought on by the revolt, repression and resulting sanctions. Finally, the 
conclusion will sum up the main points of this authoritarian upgrading 
via regime tailor-made civil society and ask what, if any, long-term 
legacies it has left. The main sources for this article were, in addition to 
available literature and print or online media, interviews with foreign-
educated Syrian returnees and their colleagues, which were conducted 
during two periods of fieldwork in Damascus in 2010 and 2011. 
It has to be emphasized that, despite its focus on some negative 
aspects, this article does not wish to criticize or deprecate the 
achievements and positive developments in Syria’s associative civil 
society since 2000, which are owed to numerous active and engaged 
individuals.1 It rather intends to draw attention to the fact that these 
successes had side-effects that not only helped to gloss over 
authoritarian realities but were intended and refined to do so.  
Syria’s Authoritarian Upgrading: a Revival of Modernization 
Theory? 
In recent years – till abruptly eclipsed by the Arab Spring in 2011 – 
research on authoritarianism, and especially its steadfastness or 
resilience, has thrived. The fact that several states, and particularly in the 
Middle East, did not follow what had been celebrated in the 1990s as the 
"Third Wave" of democratization (Huntington 1991) enabled this 
growing body of literature on modernized authoritarian or hybrid 
regimes to supersede in the 2000s period the hitherto dominant literature 
on democratic transitions. 
In comparison to older research paradigms dealing with the nature 
and development of political systems, notably Modernization Theory 
and the democratization literature, research focusing on authoritarianism 
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was intended to be less normative as well as less teleological and linear 
(e.g. King 2009, Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004). Instead it allowed for, 
and sought to explain, steps ‘back’ into more un-free systems. In 
hindsight, i.e. after the popular uprisings in several Arab countries in 
2011, it became clear that this literature had been rather too concerned 
with explaining the enduring status quo or ‘setbacks’, thereby ignoring 
the small probability of large-scale, quick changes.2 
At its core, the research on hybrid regimes was concerned with 
showing how autocrats attempted to modernize or ‘democratize’ their 
rule while remaining vague about how much power they intended to 
hand over to whom and when. By exposing this paradox, research on 
authoritarian upgrading demonstrated that authoritarian regimes not only 
wanted to be but, especially, to remain in transition to a 'modern' 
political system.  
It showed how, by employing sophisticated upgrading measures, 
autocrats sought to mimic the Western democratic mainstream. In this 
sense, authoritarian upgrading goes beyond IT-based measures of 
surveillance or other instances of technological 'upgrading' but 
concentrates on conveying a ‘modern’ image of the authoritarian state to 
both local and international audiences. Mechanisms include staging and 
rigging allegedly democratic elections3 and, as is the main concern of 
this article, licensing modern-style NGOs versed in the latest 
developmental jargon but monitored if not infiltrated by regime 
loyalists: "coercion has been supplemented by additional strategies 
through which regimes exploit the rhetoric and organizational 
frameworks of civil society to generate political resources that can be 
appropriated and used to their advantage" (Heydemann 2007: 8). In 
addition to these two instruments, Heydemann lists three more defining 
features of authoritarian upgrading: the appropriation of gains from 
selective economic liberalization; the surveillance of new 
communication technologies; and the diversification of international 
linkages (ibid.: 5). 
Another common upgrading technique, political liberalization by 
widening the scope of elections, only to severely rig them in the process, 
seems to have been considered too risky by the Syrian regime. In 
contrast, the other four ways of authoritarian upgrading may have 
appeared more manageable. Especially "upgrading" civil society lent 
itself as a particularly useful strategy because civil society is considered 
the epitome of pluralism, one of the most important preconditions of 
democracy. To stay in power, the regime must, however, also ensure 
that civil society develops only into a pluralist façade or at least one 
amenable to control within regime defined ‘red lines’. It can do so by 
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"deploy[ing] such still viable substitutes for pluralism as clientalism and 
corporatism" (Hinnebusch 1993: 244); tools which were thoroughly 
refined and upgraded over the last years as will be detailed in the 
remainder of this paper. 
Authoritarian upgrading thus concentrates on producing a discourse 
that provides regimes not only with a more quiescent domestic balance 
of power but also with an entry ticket to the international community. 
These regimes claim to be – if maybe as a latecomer and incomplete – 
striving towards universal slogans like democracy and economic growth. 
In essence, authoritarian upgrading re-clothes authoritarian rule in a way 
that follows the logics of Western transitology and, as this article shows, 
displays the mindset of Modernization Theory.  
While Modernization Theory's glory days are certainly gone4 and 
deservedly so,5 its spirit lives on and can help explain why authoritarian 
upgrading has, for a long time, worked so remarkably well.6 This applies 
especially to Modernization Theory's elitist notion – focusing on those 
who 'already' know how to develop their society and thus are expected 
to be prime agents of change –, its firm belief that development follows 
a rational and scientific process, and its – not necessarily materializing – 
promise that economic reforms will be dovetailed by political 
liberalization. Furthermore, the difficulty to define "modernity", 
resulting in the perception of steady progress towards an ultimate aim 
which, however, is never reached, caters well to the logic of 
authoritarian upgrading.  
Concentrating on these three elements, a combination of both 
theories, Modernization Theory and authoritarian upgrading, shows why 
and how, at the regime’s discretion, some actors were invited to 
participate in political or civil society activities while others were not. In 
doing so, the paper aims to go beyond the often overstated loyal-
oppositional divide, instead mapping out why some actors behave 'more' 
or 'less' loyal to the regime than others: what makes them do so and what 
possibly makes them change their mind; why some are agents of change 
and others, in turn, 'agents of non-change'. Taking persons’ education, 
family background, and – most significantly – alternative choices into 
account contributes a better or more nuanced understanding of their (re-
)positioning between political stances, and what consequences this has 
for authoritarian stability. This article tries to make more explicit who 
was allowed – or commissioned – to play a role in civil society and to 
interpret the rationale behind these recruitment processes. 
Modernization Theory and the Upgrading of Civil Society    37 
Another Revolution from Above: the Regime’s Promotion of a 
‘Modern’ Civil Society 
Over the last decade, the Syrian regime has quite successfully created a 
"model" civil society: Aiming at elitist monopolization under the 
auspices of Syria's First Lady, this could be termed a ‘second revolution 
from above’ as the following paragraphs will show. 
With the Baathist revolution of 1963 – though slightly lessened 
through Hafiz al-Asad’s Corrective Movement in 1970 – Syria 
embarked on a socialist path of development. This was devised and 
implemented "from above" (Hinnebusch 2001), despite ruling officers’ 
and party bureaucrats’ claims to act in the name of workers and 
peasants. Socialist ideology was further diluted through pragmatic 
policy choices and, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, 
‘socialism’ deteriorated into an empty label that had lost its credibility 
altogether. Yet, for fear of instability, both Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad 
refrained from restructuring or renaming the Arab Socialist Baath Party, 
but introduced non-socialist policies nonetheless. Liberalizing economic 
reforms increased from the 1990s7 but the major shift came 2005 with 
the 10th Five Year Plan, which proclaimed a ‘social market economy’ 
and called upon the active support of both private sector and civil 
society, while not even mentioning old ‘socialist’ constituencies like 
workers and peasants.8  
This necessitated an 'upgrading' of civil society's organizations: 
While existing organizations like the Peasants', Workers', or Women's 
Unions as well as diverse Baath party organizations had been the early 
populist authoritarian state’s tools for mass mobilization and control, by 
the 2000s they were joined by a quickly growing – equally loyal but 
more autonomous – new generation of organizations, which are an 
expression of the post-populist authoritarian state's turn to neoliberalism. 
"This [new] elite civil society […] is given a certain freedom. Because 
one major problem in our society is that […] nobody is able to 
communicate between society and the state. Party, official civil 
society: out of function!"9 
In its scope and significance for Syrian politics the regime’s guided 
promotion of civil society constitutes another revolution from above. 
Over the 2000s it has simultaneously encouraged as well as increasingly 
appropriated and 'tailor-made' Syria's associative field: Immediately 
after Bashar al-Asad’s rise to power in 2000, which incited expectations 
and hopes about liberalization, the non-state-orchestrated Damascus 
Spring movement was clamped down upon.10 Around the same time, in 
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2001, the first regime-supported development project FIRDOS,11 
working for rural development, was initiated by First Lady Asma al-
Asad (yet, the first NGO initiated by the very top was the Syrian 
Computer Society (SCS), founded by Basel al-Asad12 in 1989). While 
existing charities were closely monitored13 and politically independent 
organizations remained successfully marginalized, the next years saw a 
rise in loyalist and regime-supported NGOs: the Syrian Organization for 
the Disabled, AAMAL (Arabic: ‘hope’) was founded in 2002 on the 
First Lady’s initiative, too, as was MAWRED14 in 2003. Two 
entrepreneur-skills-focused NGOs SYEA and JCI were established in 
2004, as was later BIDAYA,15 which provides young entrepreneurs with 
microfinance grants and mentoring. SHABAB and MASSAR16 for 
youth and children’s education respectively, were both founded in 2005, 
again under the patronage of the First Lady; in the same year BASMA 
(Arabic: "smile!"), a charity and lobby group for children affected by 
cancer, started operating – while it was not initiated directly by Asma al-
Asad, she provided generous start-up financial and moral support. In fall 
2005, the Damascus Declaration re-started from where the Damascus 
Spring had left and, in contrast to it, managed to combine several 
oppositional groups within and outside Syria and to institutionalize itself 
with the election of a national council and a secretariat (see Ghadbian 
forthcoming; Pace/Landis 2009). However, the Damascus Declaration 
eventually met the same fate as the Damascus Spring: a clampdown and 
series of detentions pushed most of its activists into exile. In 2007, two 
high-impact but, as will be shown, both elitist and loyalist NGOs were 
founded: the Syria Business Council (SBC), which is an association of 
some of the richest Syrian businesspeople, and the Syria Trust for 
Development (in the following: STD), which combined FIRDOS, 
SHABAB and MASSAR as well as two new divisions RAWAFED, on 
cultural development, and the Syrian Development Research Centre 
(SDRC). This brief overview illustrates that, over the last decade, a new 
loyalist civil society emerged and became better organized, possibly 
spurred and accelerated by two waves of oppositional activities. 
The dichotomy between loyalist and oppositional civil society was 
reinforced by associating the most-used Arabic term for civil society, 
mudjtama al-madani, with subversive and oppositional activities, 
effectively substituting it by the expression mudjtama al-ahli, 
‘communal’ society (see e.g. Sawah 2009:5, Ruiz de Elvira 2010). Even 
though the critique of the first term was not much voiced in public17 the 
latter term, mudjtama al-ahli, is still preferred by loyalist NGOs as well 
as by other NGOs and charities, which feel they would attract negative 
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attention by using mudjtama al-madani. A discussion about how 
political civil society can and should operate followed suit: 
"Some Syrian intellectuals believe that the civil society movement 
which began in 2000 made a mistake when it mixed civil society 
activities with political endeavors that should have been left to the 
politicians and political parties of the country. […] Civil society’s 
mission is to defend values that are political in their core, such as 
democracy, freedom of expression, and human rights, but with non-
political tools and methods." (Sawah 2009) 
This caveat however seems not to apply to the "semi-official sector",18 
i.e. NGOs on the other side of the political spectrum, which are affiliated 
with the government and to some extent follow a loyalist agenda. 
Organizations initiated by Syria's First Lady have been accused of 
undermining the very defining feature of NGOs and thus been called 
'government-organized non-governmental organizations', or GONGOs. 
They could be subdivided into openly government-organized NGOs like 
STD and covertly government-organized NGOs like NOSSTIA.19 
Furthermore, NGOs which were either established via proxy or heavily 
government-influenced at a later point might be called government-
accredited NGOs or GANGOs (though other authors have assigned 
other acronyms for NGOs that suffer from this kind of government 
interference20). Syrian examples are mostly from the business world, e.g. 
SYEA, SBC, but not exclusively so.21 Proxies are selected for their 
loyalty and their willingness to follow ‘official advice’, mostly from 
amongst those who have demonstrated their closeness to the regime over 
a longer period or seem trustworthy because of their family ties (see 
section 4). Thus being ‘government-accredited’ means more than having 
received an operating license or permit of the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labour (MoSAL)22 – though both characteristics are closely 
interrelated. Yet other organizations operate like NGOs but formally are 
part of a governmental or government-influences institution.23 
The amount of money and professional advertising that went into 
'official' new initiatives, and especially into STD, was disproportionately 
large. As a former managerial employee at STD complained: "It is like 
killing mosquito with a canon: They should leave the smaller things for 
smaller NGOs!" He had hoped that STD would facilitate the 
establishment of "real NGOs but unfortunately this did not come about. 
Instead, they founded all NGOs themselves. […] They shaped the image 
of the perfect NGO [that] all other institutions now want to imitate but 
lack sufficient funding for."24 The image campaign around STD 
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culminated in early 2010 with the 1st International Development 
Conference. For instance, both Syrian English-language magazines – 
mostly targeted at the diplomatic community in Damascus as well as 
Syrian expatriates – devoted large sections on the "Civil society 
empowerment 2010" (Forward Magazine: cover) and the process of 
"Unlocking Civil Society" (Syria Today: cover).25  
Not only STD’s size but, especially, the image and position of the 
First Lady set these ventures apart from more grassroots organizations. 
The First Lady remains the chairwoman of both, STD and AAMAL, and 
seems to be involved in their day-to-day work to a considerable degree, 
as becomes clear in the following statement by an STD employee:  
"She [the First Lady] definitely had the vision, the large vision. And 
when we meet with her and we present what we've prepared and 
worked on: She would highlight whether we really are on the right 
track or not. She's not involved in the details, but she would pick up 
any missing elements so that we make sure we actually are covering 
[…everything and that] we are bringing something that speaks to the 
Syrians and yet speaks to the world."26 
Interviewees generally held positive opinions about the First Lady and 
her initiatives. Those complaining about negative side effects did not do 
so without acknowledging her efforts' merits: 
"She is determined, she is trying to do something very important, 
but… there is a certain negative side in what she is doing, which is a 
bit of a snobbist benevolence."27 
Asma al-Asad's intimate affiliation with the centre of power brings a 
significant advantage in the implementation of development work: 
"Who wants to say no to the First Lady?"28 But exactly this 
impeccability makes it difficult to criticise even technical project details, 
effectively precluding any real partnership or cooperation between the 
Trust and more independent NGOs. For instance, one interviewee 
recounted that his organization had tried to cooperate with FIRDOS on a 
project but had given up after his concerns on the project matter were 
not taken into account. Frustrated, he concluded that "the official NGOs 
take all the money, but do fake projects."29  
This corroborates the impression that the trilateral partnership 
between public sector, private sector, and civil society, as demanded in 
the 10th FYP, is meant to rest on their loyalist factions. Effectively this 
means that many government operations are outsourced from the public 
sector to hand-picked NGOs or pliable private sector companies.  
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"As an NGO, we very much work on a wider development agenda. 
Reform is happening by empowering the civil society to play a larger 
role in supporting and developing the country. The government can no 
longer afford, or do the job on its own. Nor can only the private sector 
do that."30 
A senior employee at STD described the Trust's relations with the public 
sector in the following words: 
"We're working quite a bit with the public sector. And our new 
strategy very much involves a very close partnership with the 
government. Without melding ourselves into government; we are not 
[the] government […] This is something that has changed over the last 
two years: instead of having the idea that we do a good pilot and then 
somehow the government is supposed to take it over, we are working 
now from the very beginning with the government to decide programs 
that are relevant to their needs."31 
Asked whether this constitutes an outsourcing of government functions, 
he refuted the suggestion: 
"Well, not outsourcing. We try to, actually, also sometimes advocate, 
because a lot of what we do is not available in the public sector. So the 
idea here is to approach the public sector, define the needs with them, 
and somehow create programs that both meet their needs but also our 
vision for development (ibid.)". 
He justified the close cooperation with the public sector by the fact that 
only the government had the necessary infrastructure for effective 
programmes: 
"When you are doing development you need government resources. 
You need their infrastructure […] One of the things we try to do in the 
Trust is sort of advocating a better use of these resources. And the way 
we do it is we of course embed ourselves in some of their operations, 
develop good new initiatives and then enlarge these initiatives together 
(ibid)". 
This was echoed and specified by a colleague, who works at MASSAR: 
 "In fact, we coordinate and cooperate a lot with the Ministry of 
Education. Because we wouldn’t be able to meet those children if the 
Ministry of Education would not allow those schools visits, and for us 
to meet with the schools."32 
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Does this mean that STD lobbies for political decisions? During the 
above-mentioned conference the "Syria Trust for Development, along 
with local partners, [… was] planting the seeds for a new NGO law"33: 
In her opening speech, the First Lady herself raised expectations that the 
current civil society law, dating back to 1958, was to be substituted 
soon. Yet, this was put on hold or, maybe, discussed behind the scenes. 
An STD official stated that the Trust had "very limited influence there, 
though we are expecting to have more of a role once the law is ready."34 
He nonetheless added that they have been involved in other policy areas, 
e.g. commenting on the 11th FYP when it was in preparation: 
"We have done quite a bit of advocacy on certain policy changes. [… 
But] in general we try not to get involved in the legal issues until the 
government has built certain initial, let's say, thinking on it. And then 
we intervene to help them (ibid.)". 
In 2007, SDT’s Research Division, in cooperation with the UNDP, 
created an "NGO platform", which aims to support civil society with 
capacity-building and networking opportunities and hopes to "lead to 
more inclusive participation in democratic processes and foster better 
relations between civil society actors and the state."35 
A case of successful civil society lobbying might be seen in the 
smoking ban (legislative decree 62), enforced in April 2010. One 
member of the Syrian Society for Smoking Cessation jubilated: "the 
president listened to us."36 Yet, the public perception is that the president 
did not need much convincing but, rather, that he wanted this ban for 
polishing his own image: Syria was the first Arab country with non-
smoking legislation. Reportedly, Bashar al-Asad pushed it through after 
a prolonged stand-off with influential bureaucrats – the parliament had 
rejected the law three times – in a unilateral and unconstitutional way, 
i.e. while the parliament was in session.37 Whoever was the lobbyist – 
eventually the ban has never been effectively implemented. A second 
and more 'grassroots' case of lobbying was the campaign against the new 
personal status law in 2009: Though having to withdraw the draft law 
after a public outcry was, at first, an embarrassment for the 
government,38 it later seemed to tacitly endorse this opposition and 
tolerate admiring reportage about it.39 Yet, both these campaigns were 
rather issue-related and "non-political" (Sawah 2009) in that they did not 
question the basic Syrian power balance. 
In conclusion, regime-influenced NGOs are a corporatist "self-
disciplining measure" (Wiktorowicz 2000: 55) launched by the Syrian 
state, which set an example of approved best-practise and then, by 
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staging cooperative projects, gain information about other NGOs 
working in Syria.40 The establishment of closely monitored 
organizations parallels the mass mobilization during the regime's leftist 
revolutionary days, only re-labelled and upgraded to meet 
internationally approved and promoted standards of 'civil society 
empowerment'.  
Furthermore, GONGOs represent a paternalistic – or, in the Syrian 
case, rather a maternalistic – benevolent authoritarianism, which acts on 
the state's perceived duty to assist in upbringing and instructing a 
nascent civil society. It does so by creating a patronizing, almost 
monopolizing, model which it expects to be emulated by other NGOs.41 
Critically interpreted, this is a self-colonizing version of the post-WWI 
mandate system, as was also suggested by one interviewee, who 
compared STD to 19th and early 20th centuries' implementation of 
politics from above "since the nation was seen as unable to do so."42 
Modernization Theory re-emerged in a new guise. 
The First Lady, a UK-born and -educated (former) investment 
banker, is emblematic not only of the top-down nature of Syria's new-
born civil society but also for two overlapping recruitment pools of the 
ideal development workers: the Western-educated and the business 
society. They will be characterized in the following two sections. 
Foreign-Educated Professionals for a 'Modern' Civil Society 
Over the last decade, Western-trained Syrian returnees were heavily 
recruited in several fields like economics and finance, higher education 
and, to a somewhat lesser degree, media.43 Yet, their visibility and 
influence is strongest and most consistent in the 'regime-led' civil 
society. One explanation for this is that there were only weak older ‘civil 
society’ structures in existence, so they could – free-riding on the First 
Lady's efforts – use their international experiences and specialist 
knowledge to help build up a new sector 'from scratch'. Contrastingly, in 
other fields they more often have to blend in with or compete against 
older structures like long-established businesses or Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce (economics),44 state newspapers (media) or 
public universities (higher education).45 
   The First Lady "paved the way for many things to happen, especially 
in civil society. She brought her experience in, but she adapted it [… to 
local traditions and values.] She was the example: Many followed 
her."46 With her higher UK degree in a 'modern' and hands-on subject47 
Asma al-Asad was not only a role model for Syria's development sector 
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as such, but also and especially for many expatriates considering a 
return.  
This applies to STD in particular, which "[s]ince its founding a few 
years back […] has become a magnet for well-achieved Syrians in the 
Diaspora."48 All five members on its Board of Trustees have vast 
international experiences; most hold higher academic degrees from 
European or US institutions.49 So there is the impression that mostly 
"foreigners and foreign-educated"50 are working for STD. While this is 
somewhat exaggerated when speaking about its entire workforce,51 it is 
certainly characteristic for the – internationally visible – higher 
managerial levels and its Development Research Centre, which draws 
on internationally-trained Syrian academics. For instance, STD's first 
CEO52 is US-educated architect Omar Hallaj; US-educated and longtime 
expatriate economist Nader Kabbani heads the research division; and 
British cultural consultant Robert Cole-Hamilton was director of 
MASSAR for six years, leaving a vacant position which has not been 
filled since 2010. Said a senior manager at STD: 
"We were looking closely at the market. It's not about trying to bring 
people from abroad [but] people who are interested […] The Syrian 
expatriates are themselves coming back, but we're not only  
[head-]hunting expatriates."53 
Also government-accredited charities benefit from foreign-educated 
returnees: BASMA is headed by UK-educated Mayya Asaad, daughter 
of an influential businessman; AAMAL's CEO is Chinese-educated 
engineer Rami Khalil; and the Syrian Deaf Children Society, which is 
affiliated with AAMAL, was initiated and is lead by the deaf brothers 
Feras and Wael Moubayed, who both were educated and lived most of 
their lives in the UK.54 
Often foreign-educated returnees or Syrian expatriates are recruited 
out of necessity – many development-relevant degrees are not taught at 
Syrian universities – and for other practical reasons. Especially English 
language skills, state-of-the-art expert knowledge, and previous working 
experience in the development sector's big players, e.g. UNDP, the Aga 
Khan Foundation, or Western governmental development agencies like 
the British DFID and Germany’s GIZ, are sought-after assets.55 In 
addition to these tangible advantages, in Syria, holding a Western degree 
adds considerably to a person's reputation and prestige. 
Many foreign-trained Syrians are also highly motivated to work in 
developmental organizations: The above-mentioned newness of the 
sector, which offers an interesting working experience and 
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comparatively high salaries, is a major incentive. But most interviewees 
expressed that their main motivation was to 'give something back' to 
their native country.  
"Definitely, they [the foreign-educated] have been extremely valuable 
because they have brought a wide experience with them. They are 
coming back with a very strong and sincere willingness to make the 
best of it in Syria."56 
Persons with this background are ideal employees for STD, which seeks 
to "work on grassroots level with concepts from abroad."57 One Syrian 
researcher abroad describes this emulation of Western development 
agencies in less flattering words:  
"[Critics …] believe that the mistake was to confine the idea of civil 
society to a tiny image of NGOs that were formed recently in the 
process of globalization, and which operate in accordance with a 
western vision of NGOs." (Sawah 2009) 
Indeed, the regime tries to follow a global model while appearing not 
too "Westernized", both on a general political level58 and in 
development work more specifically: "We don't need to import foreign 
ideas but to develop and build ours."59 Employing foreign-educated 
repatriates, rather than sub-contracting work to foreign experts, is a way 
of squaring the circle: with their combination of 'local' and Western 
experiences they stand for both autonomous local development and for 
Western-style modernity.  
While foreign-trained Syrians are less readily denounced as 
'imperialist' than foreign experts they still find themselves accused of 
being arrogant or detached from the rest of society.60 They are criticized 
for not having re-adapted enough to the local system. Even a senior STD 
manager admits that the overrepresentation of foreign-trained returnees 
within the Trust constitutes a problem for it as a developmental and 
'grassroots' organization: 
"The original recruits of the Syria Trust were all foreign educated with 
very little Syrian experience. […] That created a certain, let's say, 
enclave of like-minded people who were mutually supportive and in 
many ways they were looking at their experiences in the Syria Trust as 
an ideal working situation: being in Syria but yet working for an 
organisation that pretty much was run like an international 
organisation. It's something we pride ourselves on but at the same time 
it created a bit of a divide. The organisation itself became pretty much 
English-language biased, it became a bit dissociated from other 
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partners and stakeholders in Syria. One of my greatest difficulties 
when I started the job here was to convince the team that, really, if you 
want to expand, if you want this organisation to grow, to be sustained, 
we can no longer think in this enclave."61 
In the development sector, foreign-educated employees counter the 
reproach of being 'too Western' or 'not Syrian enough' by being humble: 
"Every day is a learning day for me" said one employee at STD before 
elaborating:  
"I would say a main common criteria among all of us is really, not 
only having been abroad or not, [it] is our ability to understand the 
needs of the country. Because what we would not like at all is [… that] 
some of us would project themselves as the experts and others would 
be the locals. That's not the attitude at all."62 
Understatements are, by definition, part of developmental NGOs' 
professionalism and work ethic since it is their main goal to help other 
people to help themselves:  
"I would like also to reinforce and stress that people who haven't been 
abroad have been extremely receptive and quite fast learners as well, in 
the last couple of years."63 
Though several interviewees stressed that STD was not necessarily seen 
as elitist because "they do good work" and "people on the street trust the 
First Lady",64 foreign-educated personnel to a certain degree contributed 
to these allegations and an image of a detached "enclave". Indeed, STD 
recently has begun to recruit and train more locally-educated staff.65 
In some cases, accusations of 'being too Western' come not from the 
wider public or workmates but from authoritarian hardliners, for 
political reasons: Though this is less frequent for the developmental 
sector than for higher political ranks, repatriates' difficulties to re-adapt 
to the Syrian environment provide a pretext for dismissing overly 
ambitious foreign-trained returnees. Furthermore – with the exception of 
crony businessmen or their offspring (see next section) – foreign-
educated individuals often lack an effective and protective network of 
local contacts because they stayed abroad too long. In extreme cases, 
they might find themselves outright accused of siding with an external 
enemy: 
"International contacts are harmful if you are quite connected. Because 
you will face […] accusations that you are recruited as a spy! […] It is 
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like ready accusation, okay? They want to resist you, kick you out of 
this…"66 
In fact, whether international contacts are welcomed or not depends, 
first, on the particular job description and its specific requirements for 
international cooperation and, second, on the respective person’s 
‘trustworthiness’ and loyalty to the regime: 
"If you have contact with a senior government official that means 
you're vetted at least. He or she will know that you're above board, so 
you're ok to deal with. […] Even if you have the education, the local 
contacts issue will need to be vetted."67 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to assess to what extent the regime 
influenced (GO)NGOs' actual recruitment process, e.g. by selecting or 
double-checking new employees. As for GANGOs, the regime can make 
its particular approval for certain new ventures known by, e.g., the First 
Lady’s presence at the founding event or by speeding up the process of 
gaining an official licence. Especially interesting were two different 
accounts on how BASMA evolved from a grassroots initiative by a 
group of young volunteers regularly visiting an orphanage: One of the 
founding members recounted that, before the official launch of BASMA, 
the First Lady had organized one year of international travel for one of 
the volunteers, in order to research other countries’ experiences in caring 
for children with cancer. This UK-educated person is now head of the 
organization.68 In contrast, one of the original volunteers complained 
that when "BASMA was created with [… private money], new ideas 
from abroad, and connections"69 some people, who had been engaged 
with it previously, were driven out.70 This seems to suggest that the 
authoritarian leadership and its cronies are indeed able to interfere in 
GANGOs' internal recruitment and that appointees not only need to be 
highly-skilled but also loyal.  
This collusion with the regime does not only take place in 
recruitment matters but also in terms of actual content. Foreign-educated 
persons enthusiastically and efficiently contribute to development efforts 
that fit the 'official' expectation of developmental NGOs: lobbying for 
and supporting entrepreneurship, rural development, a better care and 
integration of the disabled, etc. are all areas that the regime had 
designated appropriate to ‘civil society’. There is however little 
independent policy influence by Western-educated returnees; thus, the 
above-mentioned example of rather successful lobbying against the 
personal status law was initiated by Bassam al-Kadi, who had not been 
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abroad for longer periods.71 Returnees – like their fellow citizens, but 
more accentuated – face a trade-off: Either they achieve some positive 
change within the limits that the authoritarian system has set for 
developmental initiatives or they remain out of social and political 
activism altogether. This self-selection is even stricter for foreign-
educated Syrians since only those of them who see a viable future in 
Syria return in the first place, as the following section will illustrate. 
Revamping Crony Capitalism: the Second-Generation 
Bourgeoisie's Corporate Social Responsibility 
Compared to other parts of society wealthy businessmen are more 
capable to send their offspring abroad to acquire higher education. This 
follows an old tradition from Ottoman times72 and some interviewees 
even considered it as nearly part of the etiquette. In recent years, also 
less affluent owners of smaller businesses try to send at least one son 
abroad in order to gain knowledge about the newest management 
techniques.  
Descendants of the country's economic elite and those close to the 
regime in particular not only have more opportunities to go abroad but 
also more reasons to return than many of their less-connected peers. 
Many come back to continue the family business, and often they feel 
obliged to do so since it was their parents, who funded their studies in a 
foreign country.73  
While family businesses capitalize on returnees' skills, like new 
marketing techniques or pricing tools, here, too, readaptation to the 
Syrian environment is an issue and sometimes leads to controversies 
between family members. Maybe more often than locally-educated 
businessmen of the same age group, returnees try to set themselves apart 
from their parents' generation, either by establishing their own business 
venture74 or by becoming active in philanthropy. 
Several business-related NGOs were (co-)initiated by foreign-
educated Syrians, for example the Syrian Business Council (SBC, 
*2007), the Syrian Young Entrepreneurs Association (SYEA, *2004), 
and – as a local branch of an international NGO – Junior Chamber 
International Damascus (JCI, *2004). They stemmed mostly from 
business families on good terms with the regime and these were heavily 
overrepresented not only amongst their founding members but also in 
these organizations’ boards.75 SYEA and JCI are clearly developmental 
NGOs devoted to enhancing young people’s business skills; they might 
have served as model for the Trust’s SHABAB, which was created just a 
year later. In contrast, SBC is an exclusive club of well-connected 
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businessmen – "we invited in success stories"76 – and lobbies for 
economic policies by organizing discussions with high government 
officials and foreign ambassadors. The above-mentioned BIDAYA, in 
turn, is a tool for encouraging private companies' and businesspersons’ 
altruism, either in cash or by providing mentoring for business start-ups. 
Especially the latter greatly benefits from foreign-educated 
entrepreneurs who are ready to share their knowledge. 
Returnees' engagement also spans an increasing number of 
associations which, by their very nature, are specifically designed for 
foreign-educated Syrians: the above-mentioned "Network of Syrian 
Scientists, Technologists, and Innovators Abroad" (NOSSTIA) as well 
as alumni associations for graduates who studied in the same country, 
however, rather constitute social clubs than actively contribute to Syria's 
development.77 
Motivations for becoming socially engaged vary: First, there is the 
feeling that one 'needs to give back something to society' which, again, 
seems to be particularly important to Western-trained returnees. Like the 
above-mentioned development professionals, interviewed 
'philanthropists' were very well aware of their own privileged 
upbringing and wanted to help less-privileged Syrians through capacity 
building programmes. Second, donating money for a good cause might 
be part of a general trend of rich Syrians, who show their wealth more 
conspicuously than preceding generations (e.g. Salamandra 2004). 
Third, as anywhere else, CSR entails a high economic incentive since 
"social life brings a lot of business."78 Asked whether repatriates were 
particularly eager to effect positive change, one young entrepreneur 
responded: 
"Some of the people who return are generally working actively to 
make change. And some of them, they appear to be working but what 
they want to be is in the spotlight, to be [a] high-profile person, to 
make their other businesses go."79 
For those repatriates who, due to their long absence, lack viable business 
contacts, it also provides a possibility to network. One of SYEA’s 
founding members mused:  
"Collectively, it's a nice nest, let's say, for Syrians who studied abroad, 
to have a network, to at least talk to colleagues with similar mindset."80 
Political motives for altruist projects are paradoxical: On the one hand, 
charitable behaviour helps to polish crony capitalist families' reputation 
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and to gain a pure conscience. On the other hand, becoming engaged in 
CSR is a way to demonstrate one's willingness to establish or to 
maintain privileged relations with the regime, since corporate social 
responsibility is heavily promoted from above, especially through the 
10th FYP (Selvik forthcoming). While Selvik noted that this "so far 
failed to generate enthusiasm in the private sector" (ibid.), especially 
among Muslim Sunni businessmen who rather adhere to the Islamic 
obligation of paying zakat,81 several foreign-educated businessmen 
indicated that they already support CSR projects or were highly 
interested to do so in the future. This may be because, due to their own 
experiences abroad, they hold fewer reservations towards an inherently 
Western concept. Alternatively, following the regime’s call for socially 
responsible business could be read as a confirmation that these persons 
are on good terms with the political leadership. 
On the part of the regime, the motives are clearer: CSR is a way to 
outsource public spending for costly social policies. Due to falling oil 
rents and the regime's inability to generate enough (non-rent) revenues, 
subsidies have been reduced and, also, co-optation is being restructured 
in a more "efficient" elitist way towards loyal entrepreneurs and 
professionals, often those with international credentials and experiences. 
The regime thus gained both well-resourced and resourceful followers of 
its economic and developmental reforms.  
Hinnebusch’s early prediction that gradual economic liberalization 
would "revive the bourgeoisie" and lead to "a business-centred civil 
society" (Hinnebusch 1993: 256) came true but not necessarily in terms 
of a more effective and competitive private sector. Instead, the lobbying 
function was ‘hijacked’ by pro-regime organizations like SBC or the 
Chamber-run binational business councils. And even the private sector's 
philanthropist activities were steered to cater to the regime's needs. 
Divide and Rule: the Showcase of a Secular and Western-Style 
Civil Society  
In Syria's ethnically and religiously diverse society, the regime’s 
promotion of civil society has a distinct secular flavour, which plays into 
divide and rule politics. This section takes a closer look at this particular 
side-effect of Syrian civil society’s "elitism" and bias towards foreign-
educated personnel: the regime's rhetoric aims at marginalizing 
traditional, mostly religion-based charities82 in comparison with 
'modern' developmental NGOs and this coincides with Western states' 
image of a modern civil society and productive local partners.  
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Over recent years, the idea of ranking different "generations"83 of 
civil society became increasingly widespread: A "first generation" of 
charities helped the needy but – as stressed by the state-led civil society 
– was said to lack a long-term, sustained global vision. A "second 
generation" of developmental organizations was, instead, presented as 
essential for solving Syria's problems: 
"Civil society [is] supported with institutions like… not only charity 
organizations, but development. So we're switching […] from the 
mentality of charity to development, so it's becoming more 
sustainable. And the Syria Trust is one of the leading NGOs that is 
enhancing that kind of NGO role."84 
In contrast, a "third generation" of advocacy NGOs and lobbying groups 
has remained rare and severely disadvantaged in Syria, e.g. by being 
rejected official permission to operate.85 Moreover, most of the few 
existing advocacy groups were either initiated by government-supported 
organizations (e.g. NGO Platform), strongly promoted by government 
figures (e.g. Syrian Society for Smoking Cessation or BASMA's 
advocacy work), or became not only tolerated by the regime but 
increasingly regarded in a favourable light (e.g. Syrian Women 
Observatory). 
Yet, of all three generations, the second "developmental" level of 
NGOs was celebrated as the epitome of civil society activism, and this 
model was, as shown above, moulded by STD. In contrast, official 
discourse dismissed "first generation" charities as laudable but not really 
professional or 'modern' pre-runners: though developmental NGOs felt 
in a way proud of Syria's long history of charitable projects they 
perceived themselves to be a 'higher' and more efficient form of 
organization.86 Foreign-educated returnees may have felt that they were 
particularly well-aware of this distinction:  
"On the semi-official sector, let's say, the NGO sector they [FE 
returnees] helped a lot. Having understood what an NGO does, what 
philanthropic work is: it's not charity but developmental. So I think, 
these Syrians educated abroad did have a positive impact."87 
Since they would not fit into the ideal of a developmental NGO, newly-
established charities with "official" linkages sought to present 
themselves not just as charities but as "third generation" lobbies: 
"BASMA is not only a charity but also a pressure group" and was 
invited to appoint a representative for a working group at the Ministry of 
Health.88 
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Although the stated goal of STD's conference and particularly Asma 
al-Asad's speech was to involve all parts of society,89 it was telling that 
most key note speakers and session chairs were Syrian officials or high-
level (foreign) experts and that the participants, who were listed in the 
programme, seemed to be from a 'modern', highly-educated and urban 
background. In that respect, the conference was a showcase of a modern, 
professional, cosmopolitan and essentially apolitical development 
sector, which – despite its positive and constructive contents – is at the 
core of effective authoritarian upgrading. This discourse resembles 
Modernization Theory’s dichotomies of modern versus traditional, 
secular versus religious, scientific versus underdeveloped.  
The charities/ developmental NGOs divide is mirrored in the above-
mentioned zakat/CSR divide (Selvik forthcoming): The philanthropist 
trend is certainly not confined to 'secular' businessmen following the 
CSR model but includes an even larger number of pious businessmen 
donating in Islamic zakat tradition. Though – or because – more 
donations are collected in the Islamic way "the CSR model may appeal 
to the rulers of Syria […] because it represents an alternative to the 
Islamic welfare model" (ibid.). It seems probable that some businessmen 
donate in both zakat and CSR ways in order to sustain rapport with both 
'sides' of society.90 
During Bashar al-Asad's rule, religious charities at first enjoyed 
more official acknowledgement and freedoms but from 2008 onwards 
the regime increasingly curtailed their room to manoeuvre (see e.g. 
Pierret/Selvik 2009). While some Syrian 'Ulama were successfully co-
opted, institutional linkages between government-initiated NGOs and 
religious charities remained weak. Yet, Christian charities were 
privileged in comparison to Sunni Muslim ones (see Ruiz del Elvira 
forthcoming, McCallum 2010): This is due to religious minorities' 
perception that their rights and interests will be best safeguarded by the 
secular Baathi and itself minority-based, Alawite regime. Thus, for the 
regime, religious Sunni parts of society have always been too strong to 
ignore91 but at the same time politically suspect. Paradoxically, the 
'revolutionary and socialist' internationally isolated Syrian regime draws 
on Westernised Syrian professionals to bolster its hegemony in the 
domestic power struggle.92 
Western observers share not only the Syrian regime's latent distrust 
of Islamic groups, with whom they rarely cooperate (Donker 2009), but 
also its positive discrimination in favour of Western-educated returnees: 
There is a strong overlap between foreign-trained repatriates and what 
Kawakibi calls "cocktail civil society", i.e. French- or English-speaking 
Syrian key contacts for foreign embassies in Syria (2009: 243). This is 
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easily explicable through their fluency in the respective working 
language as well as their familiarity with Western concepts and project 
management. They are 'on the same wave length' and the Western 
media, too, tends to cater to this positive stereotype of modern and 
secular foreign-educated Arabs.93 
For authoritarian states, this also entails a material advantage: 
GONGOs enable notoriously income-needy regimes to successfully 
apply for donor states' funds for civil society promotion (e.g. Kawakibi 
2009:241; similar Heydemann 2007:5f). In contrast, independent Syrian 
NGOs are very cautious to accept foreign material support at all, for fear 
of being accused of following foreign "imperialist" agendas.94 
Eventually, large chunks of the available external funding by, for 
instance, the EU or UNDP are claimed by GONGOs. 
When, with the Arab Spring 2011 (see next section), Western states 
suddenly found themselves accused of close cooperation with autocrats, 
they realized that the sticks and carrots game they thought they had 
played so well had been mastered by autocrats, too. Authoritarian 
regimes had earned Western approval by piecemeal reforms, including 
the authoritarian upgrading of civil society. Thus, the West had become 
complicit in authoritarian regimes’ actions by ‘acting as if’ they believed 
in autocrats' reformist rhetoric.95  
Stepping up the Modernization Campaign during the Syrian 
Revolution 2011 
In March 2011 first demonstrations shook Syria, inspired by the Arab 
Spring in Tunisia and Egypt. Almost immediately Bashar al-Asad 
blamed "foreign conspirators"96 and "armed gangs" for being 
responsible for the disturbances, while civil activists reported a violent 
crackdown on mostly peaceful protesters, claiming over 5,000 human 
lives in the course of 2011. 
During the uprising, GONGOs'/GANGOs' role as a "buffer"97 
between the president and critics of his authoritarian rule became more 
apparent. However, as international and regional pressures continued to 
rise, they play this role with declining success: the "buffer function" 
became too obvious while their work was disrupted by the securitization 
of large parts of the country. Operations of the Trust were largely put on 
hold, especially those in rural communities away from Damascus. The 
Second International Development Conference, which had been 
scheduled for May 2011, was called off.98 Internal fissures between 
those STD employees vilifying protesters and those sympathizing with 
them have been on the rise.99 The First Lady herself, who not even three 
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weeks before the outbreak of the protests had been praised as the "Rose 
of the Desert" in an extremely untimely Vogue article,100 withdrew 
almost completely from public view.101 
But some of the "development policies continue despite the 
crisis."102 Many of these activities are results of long-running projects,103 
amongst them a workshop of the above-mentioned ‘NGO platform’ in 
June 2011, which "aim[ed] to develop the participants’ capacity to 
review and analyze national legislation in order to participate in the 
discussion of the new NGO law, which is expected to be publicized 
soon."104 However, in comparison to other hurriedly implemented 
political reforms105 the new NGO law has, as of the time of writing, not 
yet been brought forward to the general public. 
In an interview, the head of STD’s research division pointed out 
that, though the crisis made development work in Syria more difficult at 
present, it was "more important than ever […] to help people become 
more empowered, engaged, and informed, […] encouraging fact-based 
dialogue, building conflict resolution capacities, and integrating research 
into policy making."106 He also defended STD's intense cooperation with 
international partners.107 It seems that international linkages and 
experiences – once an asset, especially for foreign-educated returnees – 
were now increasingly eyed with suspicion.108 
The campaign for the "right" form of civil society has been further 
accentuated but redressed towards advocacy. Massa Mufti-Hamwi, a 
US-educated director at MASSAR, called for continued "social 
activism" – as opposed to "political activism"– as the saviour from the 
current crisis: 
"How [… to adopt] professional dedication and commitment to protect 
and safeguard what can be saved, despite the growing uncertainties? 
Isn't this kind of socially-based activism also imperative, though much 
less promoted, when so much wisdom and persistence are needed at 
this difficult time? […W]e need the power of actions that nurture 
active citizenship and bridge differences, fulfil social needs, and 
replace the use of force with empowerment, advocacy and peace."109 
In this opinion piece, she also criticized the old Baathist "nationalistic 
songs" and stated that her work at MASSAR "taught me how primitive 
the notion of "citizenship" still is in our society" (ibid.). While right in 
content, her wording echoes Modernization Theory's polarizing 
discourse.  
In another instance of Modernization Theory thinking and in the 
same edition of Syria Today, politics professor Abou Halaweh implies 
Modernization Theory and the Upgrading of Civil Society    55 
that the Syrian Uprising is afflicted with sectarianism, claiming that 
protesters and their social networks form part of a traditional and 
backward civil society, which needs to be modernized.110 Interestingly, 
both contributors to Syria Today seek to add authority to their statements 
by referring to Western personalities.111 This generates the 
"cosmopolitan aura" most effectively provided by foreign-educated 
returnees.  
Pushed by the protests, more "third generation" loyalist advocacy 
groups have been set up. For instance, a new initiative named "I am with 
Syria" was launched and became highly visible through a billboard and 
facebook campaign: "[It] demand[s] a new social contract […] shunning 
chaos, vandalism, and civil disobedience."112 The same point, i.e. 
blaming the crisis on violent protesters, was made by the "Syria is the 
Homeland Movement", which was established in October 2011.113 
Suspecting regime involvement in these campaigns would be mere 
speculation, but they certainly moved in a regime-friendly direction. 
Syrian citizens face three potential reactions to the current uprising: 
loyalty, voice, or exit.114 The "loyal" and passive group of fence-sitters 
has been, so far, the largest, especially in Damascus and Aleppo. As for 
foreign-educated Syrians, "exit" seems relatively widespread, especially 
for those who maintained their international contacts or business 
ventures in the Gulf countries, in the US, or elsewhere. "Voice" has to 
be understood in two contrary ways: for or against al-Asad's regime. So 
far, many tended to support the regime and to be amongst those who 
fight off demands for regime change (see preceding paragraph). Many 
businessmen not only try to preserve concrete economic privileges but, 
to some extent, also to safeguard their CSR activities and reputation. 
The regime's tactic to win to their side 'modern' and secular Syrians, 
especially those belonging to religious minority groups, by stirring up 
Islamophobia (see section 5) has, sadly, become more explicit in 
2011,115 not least through spreading fear by comparing the current crisis 
to the Muslim Brotherhood-led uprising in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. How many 'cosmopolitan' returnees will chose to openly voice 
discontent with the current situation remains unclear but improbable as 
long as Syria is able to keep wealthy and highly-skilled people engaged 
in the authoritarian upgrading of economy and 'civil society'.  
As my interviews showed, many Western-educated repatriates 
believed both in the advantages of a slow and gradual reform process as 
well as in Bashar al-Asad as the suitable reformer. The outbreak of 
massive protests and their ruthless repression must have come as an 
unwelcome surprise and shock for most of them: The authoritarian 
upgrading indeed worked so well that involved persons believed in it 
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and in it had found a good and useful role for themselves. As of the time 
of writing, they seem not prepared to give up this role any time soon. 
The reform policies of 2011 are more successful with – and explicitly 
targeted at – loyal and often cosmopolitan audiences in Damascus and 
Aleppo than international observers. As Bashar al-Asad said in an 
interview in December 2011: 
"We never said we are [a] democratic country, but […] we are moving 
forward in reforms, especially during the last nine month[s …]. It 
takes a long time, it takes a lot of maturity to be [a] full-fledge[d] 
democratic country, but we are moving that […] direction."116  
The spirit of Modernization Theory has been 'de-internationalized' and 
further nurtured since March 2011. Indeed, taking old draft laws out of 
the drawer and passing them in a rush was meant to demonstrate that 
Modernization Theory’s second stage – political reforms following 
economic liberalization – had finally begun. 
Conclusion  
Authoritarianism is all about selectivity and exclusion of "unwanted" 
political actors, and civil society is no exception. This was demonstrated 
by showing that foreign-trained professionals not only are very 
competent and well-suited for invigorating civil society activities, but 
they also – though often unconsciously – help the Syrian leadership to 
convey a positive image and gain legitimacy through a ‘modern’ yet 
loyal civil society. Involving foreign-educated Syrians was a particularly 
effective recipe for success because it made use of the young 
presidential couple’s modern and Western-educated image and 
connected them to a younger generation of businessmen, who readily 
serve as spokespersons for a gradual and 'controlled' modernization. Co-
opting secular segments of Syrian society and downplaying more 
'traditional' circles of civil society reinforced both linkages with Western 
partners and the secular orientation of the regime. This strategy proved 
fairly effective not only in terms of political power maintenance, but it 
was also very cost-saving: It helped to tap funds paid by international 
development agencies and outsource parts of the state's social burden to 
a wealthy bourgeoisie. 
As mentioned above, this article does not aim to deprecate the 
positive achievements of Syria's NGO sector, especially in the second 
half of the 2000s. Quite the contrary, it wishes to emphasize that 
numerous persons working for (GO/GA)NGOs contributed to positive 
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development despite difficult political circumstances. Yet, in order to be 
able to do so, they had to play along with a set of political rules closely 
intertwined with the authoritarian system. The constant shifting of red 
lines between acceptable and prosecutable reforms are meant to keep 
politics in limbo – in transition to a "better" political system but never 
arriving there (see section 2) – but, as the events in 2011 show, co-
optation is a process authoritarian regimes cannot rely on indefinitely.  
Like the economic side of Syria's authoritarian upgrading, i.e. the 
switch to a "social market economy", which also benefited a great deal 
from nationals with foreign degrees and international working 
experience (see Zintl forthcoming a), the 'social' side of authoritarian 
upgrading placed more importance on growth and efficacy than on 
equality. The combination of both, economic and 'social' upgrading 
measures, seemed to very effectively help to modernize autocratic rule. 
This is in line with Modernization Theory's focus on economic 
modernization and 'scientific' methods implemented by a highly-skilled 
elite. Its arguing for catch-up development and the trickling down of 
‘modern’ benefits gives a matching blueprint for authoritarian 
upgrading's modernist discourse. In fact, Modernization Theory has 
been revived through authoritarian upgrading and the prominent role 
granted to foreign-trained and other "Westernized" nationals. 
Previous research on authoritarian upgrading has mostly focused on 
political processes and the reforms themselves but left the involved 
agents under-theorized. However, as this article showed, ‘new’ agents 
were solicited by the Syrian regime according to the top-down and 
economy-centred logic of Modernization Theory: The choice of new 
"co-optees" was increasingly linked to Western education in order to 
credibly follow Western models, like Western-style NGOs and a 
liberalizing economy. By doing so, the regime jumped on the 
bandwagon of universally promoted paradigms like capitalism or 
pluralism but took unobtrusive measures to safeguard the existing 
political system and balance of power.  
Even though the mechanisms of authoritarianism upgrading lost 
much of their credibility during the Arab Spring, they are still operative 
and a powerful tool to convince fence-sitters. Yet, the most harmful 
legacy of authoritarian upgrading might be similar to the way US 
intervention in Iraq under the flag of "democracy" discredited 
democratization in the eyes of many Arabs and poisoned legitimate 
demands for a tailor-made version of democracy: Authoritarian 
upgrading exploited and degraded reform policies that are indeed a 
necessary first step towards another, freer political system. Potential 
political newcomers will face more difficulties in fighting off allegations 
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that their reforms are merely creating a more liberal façade for an 
authoritarian system. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I would like to express my gratitude to my respondents, without whose 
willingness to participate and openness this study would not have been possible, 
and to University of St Andrews' Russell Trust Award, which supported me 
with a travel grant. I would also like to thank Laura Ruiz de Elvira for 
commenting on a draft of this paper. 
2 This resembles the inability of academic research to make sense of, let 
alone predict, the sudden end of the Cold War in 1990/91.  
3 This was called “electoral authoritarianism”. See Schedler 2006 for the 
main mechanisms how regimes generate pre-determined election outcomes.  
4 Modernization Theory was developed and popular throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s. Some of its most well-known applications on the Middle East are 
Lerner (1958) and Issawi (1956). 
55 Especially its normativity and championing of a pre-determined, overly 
"scientific" and quantifiable development model, moulded on Western 
(European) history, were criticized.  
6 Modernization Theory maybe even impacted realities in ‘developing’ 
countries, effectively materializing into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
7 For details see for instance previous volumes of St Andrews Papers on 
Contemporary Syria, e.g. Sottimano/Selvik (2009) or Seifan (2010). 
8 Though the adjective “social” in the new social market economy was 
meant to placate these traditional constituencies and other potential losers of the 
new market system, in reality it evoked more confusion about its exact meaning 
and content. See own interviews and Abboud (forthcoming). 
9 Author's interview, March 2010. 
10 For detailed information on these events see George (2003) or Ghadbian 
(forthcoming). Some observers claim that the Damascus Spring and its 
crackdown was yet another instigated ‘show’ by the regime: “The Damascus 
Spring was a temporary, carefully managed political opening engineered by 
Assad to outmaneuver his rivals and consolidate his grip on power by drawing 
support from outside the regime." (Gambill 2004; similar author’s interview, 
March 2010). 
11 Firdos, meaning “paradise” in Arabic, is an acronym for “Fund for 
Integrated Rural Development of Syria.” 
12 Bashar al-Asad's elder brother, whom many already saw as the successor 
of Hafez al-Asad, died in a car accident in 1994.  
13 See Laura Ruiz de Elvira's article in this volume. 
14 Mawred, Arabic for "resource", is an acronym for "Modernising & 
Activating Women's Role in Economic Development." 
15 Bidaya, Arabic: "beginning", stands for "Boosting Inspiring Dynamic 
Youth Achievement." It is a joint effort by FIRDOS, SYEA, and MAWRED 
and affiliated with Youth Business International. 
16 Shabab, Arabic for “youth”, abbreviates “Strategy Highlighting And 
Building Abilities for Business”. Massar means “destiny” in Arabic. 
17 STD’s CEO Omar Hallaj assured in an interview that both terms are 
synonymous but himself mostly uses mudjtama al-ahli. 
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From: Al-Rai (2010), “Al-mudir al-tanfidhi lil-amana al-suriyya lil-tanmiyya 
Omar Abdul’aziz al-Hallaj li-"l-rai": Al-mudjtama al-ahli mawjud fi suriyya 
mundhu 4000 ‘aam.” [STD CEO Omar Abdal’aziz al-Hallaj to "al-Rai": Civil 
society has been present in Syria since 4000 years.], 20.9.2010, pp. 6f. 
(Available on: http://www.syriatrust.org/sites/default/files/ مﻡﺎﻋ 4000 ﺬﻨﻣ ﺔﯾﻳرﺭﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ 
دﺩﻮﺟﻮﻣ ﻲﻠھﮪﮬﻫﻻاﺍ ﻊﻤﺘﺠﻤﻟاﺍ ﺔﯿﻴﻤﻨﺘﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻳرﺭﻮﺴﻟاﺍ ﺔﻧﺎﻣﻸﻟ يﻱﺬﯿﻴﻔﻨﺘﻟاﺍ.pdf, last accessed 12.12.2011). 
18 Author's interview, April 2010. 
19 The "Network of Syrian Scientists, Technologists, and Innovators 
Abroad" was founded in 2001 on the initiative of Bashar al-Asad (see flyer 
by NOSSTIA for the 4th Conference on Scientific Research Outlook & 
Technology Development in the Arab World, December 2006 in 
Damascus). Al-Asad had instructed a minister of state and members of the 
regime-close Syrian Computer Society to explore options of founding such 
an organization (author's interview in April 2011).  
20 "Similar in content to the GONGO are the GINGO, the government-
inspired NGO, and the GRINGO, the government regulated/run and 
initiated NGO. To a somewhat lesser degree, sub-concepts such as 
QUANGO (quasi NGO), PANGO (party-affiliated NGO), RONGO (retired 
officials NGO), DONGO (donor-organized NGO), DINGO (donor 
international NGO), and CONGO (co-opted NGO) are also closely tied to 
the sphere of government" (Götz 2008: 232). 
21 The Syrian Society for Smoking Cessation (Jam'iyya Mukaafahat al-
Tadkhin, established 2006) has over 300 members, several of whom are loyalist, 
like ex-Minister of Health (1987-2004) Iyad al-Shatti. The Mustafa Ali 
Foundation, headed by artist Mustafa Ali and located in the old city, would also 
qualify as a GANGO (own observations and following Miriam Cooke's 
interpretation (2007: 69f) of his sculptures as "commissioned criticism").  
22 Syrian NGOs need to apply for a permit at MoSAL, yet several 
organizations prefer ‘illegality’ to a lengthy application procedure and, possibly, 
rejection after having disclosed details about their organization and involved 
personnel to the security apparatus. 
23 E.g. bilateral business councils need to be registered at MoET since they 
form part of the chamber system, which itself has been monitored throughout 
the Asads' rule. 
24 Author's interview, April 2010. 
25 The news coverage about the conference was ample but not entirely 
uncritical, as Forward Magazine’s ambiguous article "New directions for 
Syrian society" (p. 18) or Syria Today’s opinion piece "Development 
Challenges Demand a True Civil Society" (p. 35) showed.  
See Forward Magazine (March 2010), “New directions for Syrian society.” 
By Stephen Starr. Issue 37, pp. 18-21; Syria Today (March 2010), “Access 
all areas? Unlocking Civil Society.” By Dalia Haidar. Issue 59. pp. 27-42. 
26 Author's interview, April 2010. 
27 Author's interview, March 2010. 
28 Author's interview, April 2010. 
29 Author's interview, May 2010. 
30 Author's interview, April 2010. 
31 Author's interview, April 2011. 
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32 Author's interview, April 2010. 
33 Forward Magazine (March 2010), “New directions for Syrian 
society.” By Stephen Starr. Issue 37, p. 18. 
34 Author's interview, April 2011. 
35http://www.syriatrust.org/site/subwebsite/windex.php?websiteID=UC
ZAMk5JYW0=&websiteLang=en&mtree_id=MjA2 (last accessed 
3.1.2012). 
36 Author's interview, May 2010. 
37 Author's interview, February 2011. 
38 The new personal status law, which sought to assimilate regulations for 
all confessions and effectively meant a de-liberalization for women from 
religious minorities, was leaked to the public by head of the Syrian Women 
Observatory Bassam al-Kadi, a former Communist activist (Maktabi 
forthcoming). 
39 Syria Today (March 2010), “Access all areas? Unlocking Civil Society.” 
By Dalia Haidar. Issue 59. p. 33. 
40 STD, like the Jordanian General Union of Voluntary Societies, "is 
registered at the ministry […] like any other organization and is subject to the 
same rules and regulations. In practice, however, it [the Jordanian Union] is 
inextricably linked to the administrative apparatus through its regulative and 
oversight functions" (Wiktorowicz 2000: 55). It is very probable that STD 
accomplishes similar information-gathering activities for the Syrian MoSAL but 
it is not clear whether this is institutionalized in any way. 
41 Head of STD Omar Hallaj: "The project "Firdos" […] was the model 
which was followed, and later numerous activities entered through the doors 
which it opened" [from Arabic original] al-Rai 2010, see endnote 17. 
42 Author's interview, April 2010. 
43 Author’s interviews in 2010 and 2011; see also Zintl (forthcoming b). 
44 Yet, in the economic field, there are obvious exceptions when working in 
new institutions like private banks (permitted by decree in 2001) or the 
Damascus Security Exchange (opened in 2009). 
45 While, to some degree, 'new NGOs' compete with existing charities (see 
Ruiz de Elvira in this volume), they tend to perceive themselves as belonging to 
a new "superior" generation of NGOs (see section 5). 
46 Author's interview, May 2010. 
47 British-born to Syrian parents, Asma al-Akhras graduated from Kings 
College, London, with a BSc in computer sciences. She then worked as an 
investment banker and had been accepted to study for an MBA at Harvard when 
she married Bashar al-Asad, who came to know her during a 1.5 years' training 
period in ophthalmology in London. See e.g. Leverett 2005: 74. 
48 Forward Magazine (October-November 2011), “The director of the 
Development Research Center at the Syria Trust for Development. Nader 
Kabbani: Development policies continue despite the crisis”, p. 48. 
49 Besides the UK-educated First Lady they are French- and Danish-
educated architect Roudeina al-Khani; US-educated and London-based 
treasurer Kareem Sakka; US-educated legal expert Emad Tinawi; and 
Syrian-educated ex-ambassador to Malaysia Lamia Assi. Not only the First 
Lady enjoys close linkages with the regime but al-Khani is a consultant to 
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the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Assi is/was Minister of Tourism 
(since 2011) resp. of Economics (2010-2011) and is "in charge of [STD's] 
partnership with the Government sector" (See 
http://www.syriatrust.org/en/about-trust/trustees, accessed 12.12.2011). 
50 Author's interview, April 2010. Similarly, another interviewee – working 
for a grassroots' NGO – remarked that the Trust's employees were "selected 
because of their similarity to the First Lady" (author's interview, March 2010). 
51 At project level, foreign-trained personnel do not constitute the majority 
(e.g. author’s interviews, March/April 2010) but still constitute a much larger 
share in comparison to most fields in the Syrian private and private sectors. 
52 Until he took office in early 2010, the First Lady was CEO-in-kind but 
not in name. 
53 Author's interview, April 2010. 
54 To add in passing, artist Mustafa Ali and member of the Syrian Society 
for Smoking Cessation Iyad al-Shatti (see endnote 21) also attained academic 
degrees abroad, in Italy and the US, respectively. 
55 For instance, that AAMAL's CEO took a degree from a Chinese 
university will have mattered less than his vast international working experience 
in the development sector. 
56 Author's interview, April 2010. 
57 Author's interview, April 2010. 
58 This was for instance stressed in Bashar al-Asad's inaugural speech in 
summer 2000, in which he made clear that Syria would not follow the Western 
version of democracy but devise its own. 
59 Then STD's CEO conjures the need for more grassroots activity in that 
the Trust's work: "It does neither come from above nor from abroad, but from 
inside and the basis." Both quotes from Arabic original, in al-Rai 2010, see 
endnote 17. 
60 This issue regularly came up in interviews. See author's interviews 
March-May 2010, April 2010.  
61 Author's interview, April 2011. 
62 Author's interview, April 2010. 
63 Author's interview, April 2010. 
64 Author's interview, April 2010. 
65 Author's interview, April 2011. 
66 Author's interview, March 2010. Numerous other interviewees shared 
this opinion about disadvantages of being internationally connected, though in 
less drastic words. It was stressed that international contacts are an asset only if 
the regime considers them risk-free. 
67 Author's interview, March 2010. 
68 Author's interview, May 2010. 
69 Author's interview, March 2010. 
70 He complained that BASMA became "untouchable and very prestigious" 
and that now all volunteers must formally apply in writing, even he who had 
worked with it before it was licensed (author's interview, March 2010). 
71 Though al-Kadi neither is foreign-trained nor speaks fluent English, 
his ‘modern’ and ‘secular’ opposition to the personal status law serves the 
same purpose in the regime's campaign for a Modernization-Theory style 
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societal– not political – activism. Paradoxically, the fact that al-Kadi was 
imprisoned for political activities and that his organization is not registered 
at MoSAL makes him and his work even more valuable for the regime’s 
promotion of a non-political civil society: 
"I was imprisoned for seven years because of my political work and have 
been banned from travelling for the past 19 years. Following my release 
from prison, […] I began to see the importance of separating society from 
politics, so I left the latter and went into the area of social work"  
From: Syria Today (November 2009), “Q&A Bassam al-Kadi, Director of 
the Syrian Women Observatory.” By Nadia Muhanna. http://www.syria-
today.com/index.php/november-2009/452-society/4282-qaa-bassam-al-
kadi-director-of-the-syrian-women-observatory (last accessed 7.1.2012). 
72 Since the 19th century Arab individuals and delegates of government 
programmes (e.g. under Ottoman sultan Selim III or Egypt's Mohammad Ali) 
studied at higher education institutes mostly in Istanbul or in Europe. See e.g. 
Hourani (1983[1962]: chapter 2); Szyliowicz (1996: 297). 
73 Author's interviews, April and May 2010.  
74 As did several interviewees; see also examples in SBC 2008. 
75 For more detailed information on this, see Zintl (forthcoming a). 
76 Author's interview, April 2010. 
77 Author's interviews, April 2010. Most alumni organizations were 
established in the 2000s, e.g. the Syrian Association of the Soviet and Russian 
Higher Education Institutions' Alumni (*2002), the Syrian Graduates of German 
Universities (SADU, *2003), or the Syrian Society of US Graduates (SSUSG, 
*2005). 
78 Author's interview, May 2010. 
79 Author's interview, May 2010. 
80 Author's interview, April 2010. 
81 Zakat is one of Islam's five religious duties. See also Pierret 
(forthcoming) for the popularity and importance of giving zakat amongst Syrian 
merchants. 
82 Despite of this rhetoric, the regime also needs to support and interact 
with religious charities, which are more popular and trusted on neighbourhood 
level (see Ruiz de Elvira in this volume).  
83 The term "generation" has for example been used in Forward 
Magazine (March 2010), “New directions for Syrian society.” By Stephen 
Starr. Issue 37, pp. 20f. 
84 Author's interview, April 2010. 
85 See Forward Magazine (March 2010), “New directions for Syrian 
society.” By Stephen Starr. Issue 37, pp. 20f; Syria Today (March 2010), 
“Access all areas? Unlocking Civil Society.” By Dalia Haidar. Issue 59. pp. 
31, 35. 
86 See interview with STD's CEO: "We must look into Syrian history and 
say that its civil society is very old [… At that time] this did not exist neither in 
Europe nor in the US […] 10 years ago, the process of developing a modern 
civil society started" [from Arabic original]. From al-Rai 2010, see endnote 17. 
87 Author's interview, April 2010. 
88 Author's interview, May 2010. 
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89 One STD employee interviewed in April 2010: "We wanted to send a 
very clear statement: we want to engage more societies [sic]. We want to work 
on the development in all ways, and engage people, and everyone is implicated. 
The speech of Her Excellency, the opening speech, was extremely powerful 
[…]: every person counts in the society." 
90 Impression from author's interviews, though not corroborated within the 
defined limits of the current research project. 
91 Like his father, Bashar al-Asad has been making efforts to boost his 
Muslim credentials, e.g. by ostensibly visiting Friday prayers or celebrating 
Muslim festive days. 
92 This paradox became also clear from international news coverage on 
the development conference: "The few Syrians [at the conference] who 
presented papers were more analytical than propagandistic. Two keynote 
speakers were from the United States and the United Kingdom – hardly the 
sort of thing one expects from a country that defines itself as the throbbing 
heart of Arabism." From Daily Star (28.1.2010): “Signals of Change from 
Syria.” By Rami Khouri. Available on: 
http://all4syria.info/content/view/20680/75/ (last accessed 3.2.2010). 
93 One interviewee (April 2011) illustrated this by complaining that 
Western media frequently recurred to some well-known foreign-educated 
reformers in the Syrian cabinet, while ignoring other Western-educated 
ministers whose politics do not fit into the Western vision of successful 
neoliberal reforms. 
94 For instance, one interviewee (March 2010) stressed that their NGOs 
accept only donations "in a strict sense", i.e. without any involvement in terms 
of contents or lobbying. 
95 This is comparable to subjects in authoritarian systems who, despite 
potential pangs of conscience, ‘act as if’ they believed the regime’s propaganda. 
Lisa Wedeen (1999), who also coined the expression “acting as if”, aptly 
describes this for the personal cult surrounding Hafiz al-Asad:  
"[T]he idea […] of uttering patently spurious statements or tired slogans is 
not the one expressly articulated---Asad is in no meaningful literal sense 
the "premier pharmacist." Rather, Asad is powerful because his regime can 
compel people to say the ridiculous and to avow the absurd" (1999: 12).  
Bashar al-Asad "updated" his father’s strategy by directing a more realistic and 
'modern' rhetoric at the international community. 
96 See the president's speech in end-March 2011, available on Syria 
Comment (http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=8917, last accessed 
2.5.2011). 
97 Author's interview, November 2011. 
98 It was postponed to autumn 2011 but, at the time of writing, still has not 
taken place. 
99 Author's interview, November 2011. 
100 Vogue Daily (25.2.2011), “Asma al-Assad: A Rose in the Desert.” 
By Joan Juliet Buck. 
101 At first, she was believed to have left to the UK but in October she 
made Western headlines with failing to comment on her husband’s bloody 
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crackdown in a meeting with aid workers in Damascus and in January 2012 
was seen at a pro-government rally in Damascus.  
(See The Independent (18.10.2011), “So, what do you think of your 
husband’s brutal crackdown, Mrs Assad?” By Beach, Alastair. Avalaible at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/so-what-do-you-
think-of-your-husbands-brutal-crackdown-mrs-assad-2372008.html (last 
accessed 22.10.2011); Daily Telegraph (12.1.2012), “Assad's British wife 
rallies to his side.”). 
102 Forward Magazine (October-November 2011), “The director of the 
Development Research Center at the Syria Trust for Development. Nader 
Kabbani: Development policies continue despite the crisis”, p. 48f. 
103 For instance, SYEA and STD's research division, financially supported 
by Canada's International Development Research Centre, presented the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Syria Report 2009 in late 2011. 
104http://www.syriatrust.org/site/subwebsite/windex.php?websiteID=UCZA
Mk5JYW0=&websiteLang=en&pname=YXJ0aWNsZV9kZXRhaWxz&filenam
e=MjAxMTA3MDYxMjMwMTEw&htree_id=MTk0. 
105 These reforms included: cancellation of the state of emergency, which 
had been in place since 1963; several general amnesties; new laws covering the 
media, peaceful demonstrations, parties, and elections respectively; as well as 
establishing a commission for drafting a new constitution (for a collection see 
Syrian Arab News Agency (1.1.2012), Decrees, Laws and Decisions Issued in 
2011. Available on: http://sana.sy/eng/361/2012/01/01/391574.htm, last 
accessed 11.1.2012).Considering the detailed stipulations of all these reforms, it 
remains unclear to what extent they liberalize or, again, 'upgrade' the 
authoritarian political field. 
106 Forward Magazine (October-November 2011), “The director of the 
Development Research Center at the Syria Trust for Development. Nader 
Kabbani: Development policies continue despite the crisis”, p. 49. 
107 Forward Magazine directly asked Kabbani whether this "is necessary", 
showing that this practice has become under attack after the "foreign 
conspiracy" blame game (see previous endnote, p. 48). 
108 This impression was further corroborated by the fact that, in spring 
2011, it proved more difficult to conduct interviews with repatriates than it had 
been in 2010. 
109 Syria Today (November 2011), “What Does "Activism" Mean in 
Today’s Syria?” By Massa Mufti-Hamwi. http://www.syria-
today.com/index.php/component/content/article/833-focus/17034-what-
does-qactivismq-mean-in-todays-syria- (last accessed 4.12.2011). 
110 Interestingly, he thereby inverses the 'positive' and 'negative' 
connotations of mudjtama al-ahli and mudjtama al-madani: 
"In Arab society, there is a conceptual difference between civic and 
civil societies—a distinction absent in English, which conflates the two 
in one word. Civil society, according to German sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies, is based on inherited bonds and organisations that a person is 
born into, in which freedom of choice is not involved. Civic society, in 
contrast, refers to voluntary, nongovernmental and non-patrimonial 
social organisations that enlarge people's capacities to participate in 
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public life; relations here are based on freedom, interest, and voluntary 
affiliation. For historical and cultural reasons, Arab civic society is still 
essentially more of a civil society, composed mainly of charitable civil 
associations and NGOs with social and religious solidarity missions. 
These need to be transformed into advocates of development, with 
long-term, as opposed to partial, short-term solutions." 
(From: Syria Today (November 2011), “From Clans to Facebook.” By 
Karim Abou Halaweh. http://www.syria-today.com/index.php/ 
component/content/article/833-focus/17033-from-clans-to-facebook (last 
accessed 4.12.2011)) 
111 Mufti-Hamwi evokes Mother Teresa for social activism's peaceful 
mission while Abou Halaweh uses a theory by German sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnis (See articles in Syria Today November 2011, as in previous two 
endnotes). 
112 Forward Magazine (June-July 2011), “A new civil society initiative 
launched in Syria”, p. 20. 
113 Bassam al-Kadi (see endnote 71) is one of the founders: It seems he 
moved back into politics but this time supporting the status quo.  
See Syrian Arab News Agency (2011), Ittlaq haraka suriyya al-watan. Al-
'amal bil-wasail al-madania wa al-dimuqratiyya al-silmiyya lil-khurudj min 
al-azma [Arabic: Launch of the Syria is the Homeland Movement. Work 
with civil, democratic, and peaceful means towards a way out from the 
crisis]. http://www.sana.sy/ara/2/2011/10/26/377852.htm, (last accessed 
25.10.2011). 
114 On these terms see Hirschman 1970. 
115 For instance, government-controlled media claimed in April 2011 
that Islamists had announced a Caliphate in Der'aa, then reported that 
extremists smuggled in weapons from Lebanon, and were quick to blame 
two bombings in Damascus, in December 2011 and January 2012 
respectively, on al-Qaida and fundamentalist Salafi groups. 
116 Author’s italics, see ABC news (7.12.2011): “TRANSCRIPT: ABC’s 
Barbara Walters’[sic] Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.” 
Available on: http://abcnews.go.com/International/transcript-abcs-barbara-
walters-interview-syrian-president-bashar/story?id=15099152#. 
TuCrXvJGnG0 (last accessed 8.12.2011). 
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